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UNTANGLING THE WEB OF CONSIGNMENT LAW: 
THE JOURNEY FROM THE COMMON LAW & 
ARTICLE 2 TO REVISED ARTICLE 9 
WILLA GIBSON*  
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines and analyzes the law of consignments 
from the common law through Revised Article 9 with a goal towards 
identifying and analyzing the uncertainties and confusion that have 
persisted throughout the transition from the common law to the 
UCC. The law of consignments has abounded with uncertainty since 
its genesis under common law. In an attempt to clarify the persis-
tent confusion and disarray surrounding the law, the UCC enacted 
section 2-326; but the statute was not a model of clarity, engen-
dering increased uncertainty and confusion. Courts wrestled with 
how to interpret the provision to be consistent with the intent of the 
UCC drafters. In 1999, the UCC moved consignments from Article 
2 to Article 9 and made substantial revisions to both Articles to 
provide greater clarity. While Article 9 provides a much more 
comprehensive legal framework for consignments, in many respects 
it is a reformulation of former Article 2-326. Thus, many of the 
uncertainties concomitant with the Article 2 coverage of consign-
ments continue to persist under Article 9. And the revisions to Arti-
cle 9 have generated new issues on which courts are split, creating 
even more confusion. In August 2017, the Permanent Editorial 
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code drafted a Commentary and 
proposed certain amendments to resolve some of the uncertainties 
surrounding the Article 9 revisions. The commentary and amend-
ments provide much-needed clarity, but they leave unresolved several 
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significant issues in which uncertainty persists and on which courts 
are split. The goal of this Article is to identify and analyze the vari-
ous uncertainties that have arisen from the common law through 
Revised Article 9 and to propose revisions that include removing 
consignments from the definitional provision of Article 9 to its own 
separate provision in Article 9 to resolve more extensively the persis-
tent and burgeoning uncertainties identified throughout this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, one commentator discussing consignments stated 
that “[f]ew widely used commercial devices have had so checkered 
and volatile a legal history as the consignment. And few such de-
vices have been able to survive so long and tortuous a legal his-
tory and yet retain so many elements of confusion and disarray.”1 
Almost forty years later, the confusion and disarray surrounding 
consignments persist. Once governed by common law, later by 
Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and, currently, by 
Revised Article 9 of the UCC, each iteration of consignment law has 
presented the courts with a myriad of legal challenges all stem-
ming from one central issue: Whether creditors of a consignee can 
assert claims against consigned goods in the possession of their 
debtor/consignee?2 
Under the common law, consignee’s creditors could not assert 
claims against consigned goods even though consignors were not 
required to provide public notice of their consignment transac-
tions.3 This was problematic for creditors of consignees, who often 
provided funding under the mistaken belief that consignees’ posses-
sion of consigned goods signified their ownership of them.4 The 
common law also presented various legal challenges as courts grap-
pled with how to distinguish consignments from other types of 
commercial transactions that shared similar characteristics.5 
The decision to remove consignments from common law cov-
erage to Article 2 was motivated by both a desire to provide greater 
clarity and to remedy the concern that the consignee’s ostensible 
ownership of consigned goods misled creditors who were unaware of 
undisclosed consignment arrangements.6 Unlike the common law, 
section 2-326 provided that a consignee’s creditors could assert 
claims against consigned goods unless the consignor could prove 
                                                                                                                        
1 William D. Harrington, The Law of Consignments: Antitrust and Commer-
cial Pitfalls, 34 BUS. LAW. 431, 431 (1979). 
2 See infra Parts II–V. 
3 John Hicinbothem, Consignments, Creditors’ Rights and U.C.C. Section 
2-326, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 62, 62 (1967). 
4 See id. 
5 See infra note 26. 
6 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 62–63. 
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that one of the exceptions found in section 2-326(3) applied.7 Each 
exception was premised on the idea that a consignee’s creditors 
were either generally aware or had notice of the consignment 
arrangement, thereby eliminating the concern regarding secret 
liens.8 However, even after the enactment of UCC section 2-326, 
the confusion and disarray surrounding consignments persisted.9 
Section 2-326 engendered uncertainty presenting various prob-
lems for the courts, which split on how to judiciously interpret the 
section to achieve the underlying goals of Article 2.10 In 1980, 
two prominent commentators stated that, “[t]he Code’s handling 
of consignments is fraught with uncertainty, and the Code cases 
on the subject clear up little.”11 
The decision to move consignments from Article 2 to Arti-
cle 9 was prompted by a desire to provide greater clarity and to 
resolve in an efficient and comprehensive manner the persistent 
and ever burgeoning uncertainties that surrounded Article 2.12 
The move to Article 9 came with substantial revisions to Articles 
2 and 9 with an expectation for greater clarity, uniformity, and 
predictability to the law of consignments.13 Specifically, the Ar-
ticle 9 revisions treat the law of consignments in a more com-
prehensive fashion.14 It has not succeeded, however, in resolving 
                                                                                                                        
7 U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1957) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999). 
8 Id. § 2-326 cmt. 2 (1999). 
9 See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 
DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 1 (August 14, 2017) [hereinafter PEB COM-
MENTARY DRAFT]. 
10 Id. The Draft notes that “[b]efore the 1999 revision of Article 9 and its 
attendant revision of § 2-326, many believed that ‘[t]he Uniform Commercial 
Code’s provisions regarding consignments [were] not models of draftsman-
ship.’” Id. 
11 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-4, at 883 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE 
& SUMMERS, HANDBOOK]. 
12 See PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that “[t]he 1999 
revision of Article 9 clarified these provisions, in most cases without changing 
the rights of the creditors of the consignee”). 
13 See id. 
14 Under Article 9, consignments are classified as purchase money security 
interests; and consignors are required to perfect their interests by filing a fi-
nancing statement to protect their interest against judicial lien creditors. U.C.C. 
§§ 9-103(d), 9-310(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). And to pro-
tect their interest against secured creditors, consignors must file a financing 
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all of the uncertainties that were left unanswered by its prede-
cessor.15 And the advent of the 1999 revisions engendered some 
new issues about which courts and commentators are uncertain.16 
In August 2017, the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) for the 
UCC drafted proposed amendments to Articles 2 and 9’s Official 
Comments to resolve some of the uncertainties which persist.17 The 
Official Comments provide much-needed clarification but still leave 
some of the issues presented in recent court opinions unresolved.18 
The goal of this Article is to identify the various uncer-
tainties that have arisen and their genesis, analyze the legal effect 
of those uncertainties, and discuss how those uncertainties can 
best be resolved to promote the underlying goals of Article 9. This 
Article also highlights how the draft PEB proposed amendments 
to Article 2 and 9’s Official Comments seek to resolve some of 
the uncertainties. As part of the analysis, this Article provides an 
in-depth look at the jurisprudence that has developed from the 
common law through the 1999 UCC revisions. 
Part I of the Article provides an overview of consignments. 
Part II of the Article examines the common law treatment of 
consignments. Part III examines pre-1999 UCC treatment of con-
signments, identifying and analyzing the areas of uncertainty in-
volving competing claims to consigned goods. Part IV discusses the 
1999 UCC consignment law revisions as they pertain to the rights 
of consignors and consignee creditors and analyzes the uncer-
tainties that have arisen concerning these parties’ rights. Part V 
discusses judicial treatment of consignments under Revised Ar-
ticle 9 with a goal towards providing resolutions for the uncer-
tainties created by the revision. The Conclusion states that a 
comprehensive revision to Article 9 consignment law should be 
considered that includes moving consignment coverage from the 
definitional provision of Article 9 to its own separate provision to 
resolve fully the uncertainties identified throughout this Article. 
                                                                                                                        
statement and comply with the inventory purchase money security interest 
priority rule. Id. §§ 9-310(a), 9-324(b).  
15 See PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 1. 
16 See infra Part V. 
17 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
18 See infra Part V. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF CONSIGNMENTS 
A.  Introduction 
A true consignment transaction involves the entrusting or 
delivery of goods by the owner, the consignor, to another party, the 
consignee, with the understanding that the consignee will attempt 
to sell the good on behalf of the consignor.19 Generally, owners use 
consignments to avoid the risk associated with finding a market 
for, and to maintain control over the pricing of, their goods.20 In a 
“true consignment,” the consignor maintains control over the 
pricing of the consigned good and retains title and ownership of 
the good.21 The good is delivered to the consignee who is author-
ized to sell the good based on the consent of the consignor, and the 
consignor establishes the price at which the consignee must sell 
the good.22 Any time prior to sale of the good, the consignor can 
demand return of it, and when the consignee does sell the good, the 
consignee is paid a set commission by the consignor, rather than 
receive a profit.23 The consignee must return the good if it is not 
sold, and at no time is the consignee obligated to pay for the good.24 
The operative word in the term true consignment is the term 
true because, even though parties may title their agreement a 
consignment, a court may conclude that the agreement is an en-
tirely different type of commercial transaction such as an out-
right sale, sale or return, true bailment, or even a security interest 
securing an obligation.25 Courts have long-wrestled with how to 
distinguish true consignments from the other types of commercial 
transactions that are facially similar to, but substantively differ-
ent from, consignments.26 A court’s conclusion that an agreement 
                                                                                                                        
19 Excel Bank v. Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, 290 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
20 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 64; see Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer 
(In re Ide Jewelry Co., Inc.), 75 B.R. 969, 977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
21 United States v. Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d 287, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 808. 
22 Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 808. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 807–08. 
25 See id. at 805. 
26 See In re Mississippi Valley Livestock, Inc., 745 F.3d 299, 302–04 (7th 
Cir. 2014); Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299–302 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Liebzeit v. 
FVTS Acquisition Co. (In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co. of Sherwood Michigan), 
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titled a consignment is in actuality an entirely different type of 
commercial transaction may be a game changer concerning the 
respective rights of the parties asserting competing interests in 
the consigned goods.27 
B. True Consignment 
A true consignment creates a bailment agency relationship 
with the consignor as the principal and the consignee as the agent.28 
In Liebzeit v. FVTS Acquisition Co., the bankruptcy court for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin defined a true consignment as: 
[A] simple sales agency in which goods are delivered to a dealer 
for resale purposes, and this device is used as a price-fixing ar-
rangement whereby the consignor may direct that the consignee 
charge a certain price for the goods. Both parties anticipate 
that the goods will eventually be transferred to a third party, 
and the consignor will be paid thereafter, usually with payment 
reduced by the consignee’s fee.29 
Consignments are considered a type of bailment (bailments 
for the purpose of sale) because they, like bailments, involve the 
entrusting or delivering of a thing to another person by an owner 
who retains title and control over the thing the owner delivered.30 
But true consignments satisfying the Article 9 statutory definition 
are governed by the UCC while Article 9 does not apply to true 
bailments.31 Notwithstanding the difference in legal treatment 
                                                                                                                        
465 B.R. 808, 818–21 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012); Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Greenline 
Equip., Inc. (In re Greenline Equip., Inc.), 390 B.R. 576, 579 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 
2008); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., v. AVCO Corp. (In re Citation Corp.), 
349 B.R. 290, 295–97 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer 
(In re Ide Jewelry Co., Inc.), 75 B.R. 969, 973–74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Gen. 
Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d 1240, 1244–
45 (Ala. 1983); In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL3489869, at 
*4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2005); First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie v. Olsen, 403 
N.W.2d 661, 665–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Italian Design Imp. Outlet v. New 
York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 891 N.Y.S.2d 260, 265–66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
27 See, e.g., In re Mississippi Valley Livestock, 745 F.3d at 302–04; In re 
Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co., 465 B.R. at 818–21. 
28 Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 298. 
29 In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co., 465 B.R. at 818. 
30 Id.; see Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 804. 
31 The Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to transactions that are 
purely bailments. In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co., 465 B.R. at 819. 
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however, every consignment can be considered a type of bail-
ment, but not every bailment is a consignment.32 The reason is 
that, in a true bailment, the goods delivered by the bailor are the 
same goods returned to the bailor once the purpose for which the 
bailment was created has been fulfilled.33 While in a consign-
ment, the consignor delivers the goods to the consignee for re-
sale, and those goods are only returned to the consignor if the 
consignee is unable to sell them.34 Even though goods are only 
returned in a consignment if they are not sold, the United States 
Supreme Court in as early as 1893 in Sturm v. Booker noted that 
consignments were still a type of bailment stating that: “[t]he 
agency to sell and return the proceeds, or the specific goods if 
not sold, stands upon precisely the same footing [as a bailment], 
and does not involve a change of title.”35 
II. COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF CONSIGNMENTS 
Under the common law, creditors of a consignee had no 
claim against consigned goods in the possession of the consignee.36 
Consignments were viewed as true bailments in which the title 
to the consigned goods remained with the consignor creating an 
agency relationship between the consignor and the consignee.37 
                                                                                                                        
32 Id. at 818. 
33 See In re Mississippi Valley Livestock, Inc., 745 F.3d 299, 302–03 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
34 Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522, 530 (1913); JP Morgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., v. AVCO Corp. (In re Citation Corp.), 349 B.R. 290, 296–
97 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006) (finding that a bailment, not a consignment agree-
ment, was executed by the parties highlighting that the owner did not authorize 
the bailee to sell the good it had delivered); United States v. Nektalov, 440 F. 
Supp. 2d 287, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 790 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003); see Fariba v. Dealer Servs. Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
219, 225–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
35 Sturm v. Booker, 150 U.S. 312, 330 (1893) (alteration in original). 
36 See Sturm, 150 U.S. at 330 (“An essential incident to trust property is 
that the trustee or bailee can never make use of it for his own benefit. Nor 
can it be subjected by his creditors to the payment of his debts.”); Ludvigh, 
231 U.S. at 528; Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber 
Co., 437 So. 2d 1240, 1244 (Ala. 1983) (noting that prior to the UCC “[i]f the 
consignee had an absolute right to return unsold goods without any obliga-
tion to pay for them, the arrangement fell outside the requirement for chattel 
mortgages and liens.”). 
37 Ludvigh, 231 U.S. at 528. 
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The consignment transaction was emphasized as a bailment with 
a right of return of the good to the consignor.38 Since title to the 
consigned goods remained with the consignor, consignee’s credi-
tors had no claims to such goods, thus preventing them from secur-
ing an interest or attaching a lien to them.39 As such, consigned 
goods were impervious to claims asserted by consignees’ credi-
tors, even though the creditors had provided financing based on 
their consignee/debtor’s apparent ownership of the goods.40 
The common law treatment of consignments placed a con-
signee’s creditor in the unenviable position of having to forfeit its 
perceived claim to consigned goods after having relied on a con-
signee’s possession of those goods in providing financing.41 In many 
instances, creditors made loans secured by debtors’ inventory un-
der the mistaken belief that a consignee’s possession of the con-
signed goods signified its ownership of them.42 The result was 
particularly troublesome since the law did not require consignors to 
record or provide any type of notice to prospective creditors of 
their interests.43 Effectively, the undisclosed consignment agree-
ments created secret liens on what appeared to the consignee’s 
creditors as the consignee’s inventory.44 Consequently, consignee’s 
creditors bore the risk of loss even though in many instances 
they were not able to discover the consignment transaction.45 
III. UCC ARTICLE 2 TREATMENT OF CONSIGNMENT LAW 
A. Introduction 
Former section 2-326 of the UCC was adopted to protect 
creditors against hidden liens of consignors when consignees had 
                                                                                                                        
38 Id. 
39 Excel Bank v. Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, 290 S.W.3d 801, 807–08 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
40 See id. at 807. 
41 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 62. 
42 First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1987); Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 807; see Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 
62–63. 
43 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 62. 
44 Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 807. 
45 See id. 
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ostensible ownership of those goods.46 Under former section 2-
326, goods delivered primarily for resale would be classified as a 
“sale or return” transaction if the goods were delivered for sale and 
the person to whom they were delivered maintained “a place of 
business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a 
name other than the name of the person making delivery.”47 While 
such goods were in the buyer’s possession, they would be subject to 
the claims of the buyer’s creditors.48 Section 2-326 deemphasized 
the consignor’s reservation of the title as the hallmark for pro-
tecting consigned goods from the reach of the consignee’s credi-
tors by providing instead that “[t]he provisions of this subsection 
are applicable even though an agreement purports to reserve title 
to the person making delivery until payment or resale or uses such 
words as ‘on consignment.’”49 Subjecting the consigned goods to 
the claims of the consignee’s creditors effectively shifted the risk of 
loss from consignees’ creditors to the consignor, reversing the 
common law result that placed the risk of loss with the consign-
ee’s creditors.50 
Section 2-326(3) did provide, however, that a consignor could 
avoid claims of consignee’s creditors if the consignor proved: (a) 
the consignor had complied with an applicable sign law; (b) it was 
generally known by the consignee’s creditors that the consignee 
was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others; or (c) 
                                                                                                                        
46 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey 
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 469–70 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009); Quaker City Iron 
Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R. 340, 343 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1984); Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 807. 
47 U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 
1999). A merchant was viewed as operating under a name other than the deliver-
er’s name provided that the consignee did not “so completely identify his business 
with that of the consignor ‘that potential creditors would necessarily assume 
that the business was that of the consignor solely.’” In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 
49 B.R. at 343. 
48 U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1999); see Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide 
Jewelry Co., Inc.), 75 B.R. 969, 974 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that the goods 
must be in the “buyer’s possession at the time the buyer’s creditor assert their 
claims, in order for those goods to be subject to their claims” under section 2-326). 
49 U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999); see GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin 
Co., 474 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (W.D. Pa. 1979). 
50 Eurpac Serv. Inc. v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 37 P.3d 447, 450 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2000). 
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the consignor had complied with section 9-114.51 The underlying 
premise of each exception was that notice had been given to a con-
signee’s creditors that the consigned goods were not owned by 
the consignee, thereby eliminating any concern regarding undis-
closed consignment arrangements.52 
Courts interpreted section 2-326(3) as placing the burden 
of proof on the consignor to establish that it had satisfied one of 
the exceptions to avoid claims of a consignee’s creditors.53 In order 
to avoid consignees’ creditors’ claims, consignors alleged frequently 
that creditors’ claims were precluded by one of the three excep-
tions in section 2-326(3) or that Article 2 did not apply to the 
consignment because it did not qualify as a “sale or return.”54 
Much confusion existed surrounding how to determine whether 
an exception applied and what rendered a consignment a “sale 
or return.”55 It became apparent that Article 2’s coverage of con-
signments was “fraught with uncertainty,”56 as the courts grap-
pled specifically with two distinctive issues: (1) Whether certain 
2-326(3) exceptions applied and (2) Whether the consignment trans-
action was a “sale or return,” or a consignment intended as a 
security interest governed by Article 9, rather than Article 2.57 
B. Section 2-326(3) Exceptions 
1. “Generally Known by Creditors” Exception 
The most commonly proffered exception asserted by con-
signors was section 2-326(3)(b), which provided that a consignor 
                                                                                                                        
51 U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999); see GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 
1362 (noting the three exceptions of § 2-326(3)); Eurpac Serv. Inc., 37 P.3d at 
450 (noting that “[t]his shifting of risks to the consignor is not complete, however, 
as § 2-326(3) provides three exceptions.”). 
52 Heller Fin., Inc. v. Samuel Schick, Inc. (In re Wedlo Holdings, Inc.), 248 
B.R. 336, 341 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
53 Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 
B.R. 340, 343–44 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. 71, 74 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1988); see Belmont Int’l, Inc. v. American Int’l Shoe Co., 831 P.2d 15, 
18 (Or. 1992). 
54 See, e.g., In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. at 342–44. 
55 Id. 
56 Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d 
1240, 1244 (Ala. 1983) (quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK, supra note 
11, § 22-4 at 883). 
57 See, e.g., In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. at 342–44. 
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could avoid a consignee’s creditors’ claims if it could prove that 
the creditors of the consignee generally knew that the consignee 
was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.58 How 
best to interpret this exception caused a split in the courts, fuel-
ing uncertainty concerning the level of proof necessary to satisfy 
section 2-326(3)(b).59 The most contentious issue surrounding 
the “generally known” exception was whether a consignor met 
its burden of proof by merely establishing that the creditor com-
peting against it had actual knowledge of the consignee’s prac-
tices.60 If the purpose of section 2-326 was to protect creditors 
which had been misled by secret liens, did a creditor with actual 
knowledge of the consignment have any justifiable legal basis under 
section 2-326 to assert its claim against the consigned goods?61 
Courts that ruled a consignor met its burden of proof by 
establishing that the competing creditor has actual knowledge 
justified their rulings by emphasizing the UCC policy underlying 
the adoption of section 2-326.62 They stressed that section 2-326 
was adopted to protect only those creditors that had provided fund-
ing under a mistaken belief that their debtor owned the consigned 
goods in its possession.63 If a creditor knew about the consign-
ment arrangement it had no need of protection.64 In GBS Meat 
                                                                                                                        
58 U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 
1999); see GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co., 474 F. Supp. 1357, 
1362–63 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Eurpac Serv. Inc. v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 37 
P.3d 447, 450–51 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie 
v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Belmont Int’l, Inc., 831 
P.2d at 19. 
59 See, e.g., Eurpac Serv. Inc., 37 P.3d at 450–51. But see, e.g., In re Wicaco 
Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. at 343–44. 
60 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1362–63; Eurpac Serv. Inc., 
37 P.3d at 450–51; First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie, 403 N.W.2d at 665; 
Belmont Int’l, Inc., 831 P.2d at 19. 
61 Eurpac Serv. Inc., 37 P.3d at 450–51; First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie, 
403 N.W.2d at 665; Belmont Int’l, 831 P.2d at 19. 
62 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1362–63; Eurpac Serv. Inc., 
37 P.3d at 450–51; First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie, 403 N.W.2d at 665; 
Belmont Int’l, 831 P.2d at 19. 
63 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1362–63; In re Gross Mfg. & 
Importing Co., 328 F. Supp. 905, 905 (D.N.J. 1971). 
64 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1362–63; First Nat’l Bank of 
Blooming Prairie, 403 N.W.2d at 665. 
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Industry Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co. the federal district court in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania stated the following: 
The clear import of the comments to § 2-326, and the judicial 
precedents discussed above establish that, where a secured cred-
itor knows that the proceeds [from the sale of consigned goods] 
rightfully belong to a consignor, the consignor must have pri-
ority. Any other construction of § 2-326 would contravene the 
intent of that section and would sanction intentional conver-
sions of [consigned] goods or proceeds.65 
In Belmont International v. American International Shoe 
Company, the Supreme Court of Oregon criticized those courts 
that required consignors to prove that most creditors had knowledge 
of the consignee’s business practice stating that those courts 
placed too much emphasis on the “s” in “creditors.”66 And in Eurpac 
v. Republic, the Colorado Court of Appeals stated that it was 
absurd to interpret section 2-326 as not holding a creditor re-
sponsible if it had actual knowledge, since the provision imputes 
knowledge to unknowing creditors if such knowledge could rea-
sonably have been obtained since it was generally known by a con-
signee’s creditors.67 The court stressed that such a result would 
give greater weight to imputed knowledge than to actual knowledge 
of a consignee’s practices.68 
Other courts rejected, however, the contention that the “gen-
erally known” exception was satisfied if a consignor proved only that 
the competing creditor had actual knowledge of the consignee’s 
business practices.69 These courts held that the consignor was re-
quired to prove that the consignee’s practices were generally known 
                                                                                                                        
65 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1363; see ATG Aerospace, 
Inc. v. High-Line Aviation Ltd. (In re High-Line Aviation, Inc.), 149 B.R. 730, 
737 (Bankr. N.D. Ga 1992) (finding that actual knowledge of the creditor satisfied 
the exception, reasoning that the section 1-102 of the UCC allows the Code 
provisions to be construed liberally to promote its underlying purposes). 
66 Belmont Int’l, 831 P.2d at 19. 
67 Eurpac Serv. Inc. v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 37 P.3d 447, 451. 
68 Id. 
69 In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. 71, 75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding that evi-
dence of 250 out of 600 suppliers knew the consignee was substantially engaged in 
the business of selling goods of other was not sufficient to satisfy the “generally 
known” standard noting that the number may indicate that some, but not most, 
of the creditors knew). 
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by a majority of its creditors.70 Majority means most, not some; yet 
judicial precedent never has established a requisite percentage 
as the percentage necessary to constitute a majority.71 However, 
one consistent judicial approach has been that the “majority” re-
quirement is determined by looking to the number of creditors 
that have knowledge, not to the amount of claims.72 Also, courts 
have not allowed a consignor to include inside-creditors of the 
consignee as part of the majority, holding that such parties are 
expected to know.73 The appropriate inquiry is what percentage 
of outside creditors know of the consignee’s practices.74 
The “generally known” exception also required that the con-
signor prove that the consignee’s creditors knew that the con-
signee was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.75 
Judicial precedent did not establish what percentage of the debtor’s 
business had to be consignment sales to satisfy the “substantially 
engaged” standard, but at least one court found that ten percent 
was not sufficient to satisfy the standard.76 
2. “Sign Law” Exception 
Section 2-326(3)(a) provided that consignors could avoid 
claims of consignee’s creditors if they “complie[d] with an applicable 
law providing for a consignor’s interest or the like to be evidenced 
by a sign.”77 Under the sign law, consignors could avoid claims of 
competing creditors if the consignee posted a sign on its premise 
                                                                                                                        
70 Steege v. Affiliated Bank/North Shore Nat’l (In re Alper-Richman Furs, 
Ltd.), 147 B.R. 140, 150 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. at 75; 
Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R. 340, 
344 (E.D. Pa 1984). 
71 In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. at 75. 
72 In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. at 344 (holding that one-fifth of credi-
tors knowing about the consignee’s practices was not sufficient to satisfy the 
“generally known” standard even though the 1/5 held “sixty-three percent of 
the claims against the debtor”). 
73 In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd., 147 B.R. at 149–50. 
74 Id. at 150. 
75 ATG Aerospace, Inc. v. High-Line Aviation Ltd. (In re High-Line Aviation, 
Inc.), 149 B.R. 730, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992). 
76 Id. 
77 U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(a) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
amended 1999). 
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notifying parties it was selling consigned goods.78 However, the 
sign law provision was not available in those jurisdictions that 
did not have sign laws.79 
3. “Compliance with Section 9-114” Exception 
Section 2-326(3)(c) was another exception that garnered 
some confusion that created uncertainty. It provided that a con-
signor could avoid the claims of consignee’s creditors if it complied 
with former section 9-114.80 And section 9-114 provided that a 
consignor would have priority over a perfected secured party, if 
the consignor had filed a financing statement before the consignee 
took possession of the goods and had sent notification of its con-
signment to the competing secured party before the consignee re-
ceived possession.81 Section 9-114 mirrored the former Article 9 
priority rule for purchase money security interests, thereby effec-
tively treating the consignor as a purchase money secured party, 
which could prevail against conflicting security interests in the con-
signed goods by satisfying the same requirements a purchase 
money secured party had to satisfy to have priority in inventory.82 
The confusion surrounding the application of section 9-114 
involved the language of the provision. Section 9-114(1) provided 
that a consignor would have priority over competing perfected 
creditors if section 2-326(3) required it to file under Article 9, and if 
it complied with section 9-114 filing and notice requirements.83 
Courts questioned whether the priority language in section 9-114 
                                                                                                                        
78 Barber v. McCord Auto Supply, Inc. (In re Pearson Indus. Inc.), 47 B.R. 
914, 928 (S.D. Ill. 1992). 
79 Id. 
80 U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(c) (1999); Steege v. Affiliated Bank/North Shore Nat’l 
(In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd.), 147 B.R. 140, 149 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); 
Multibank Nat’l of W. Mass. v. State St. Auto Sales, Inc. (In re State St. Auto 
Sales, Inc.), 81 B.R. 215, 217 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); see also In re High-Line 
Aviation, Inc., 149 B.R. at 738. 
81 U.C.C. § 9-114 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 
1999). § 9-114 also provided the consignor priority in cash proceeds generated 
from the disposition of the consigned goods provided the cash was received on 
or before delivery of the goods to the buyer. Id. 
82 Id. § 9-312(3); In re State St. Auto Sales, Inc., 81 B.R. at 217 (noting 
that, “the section parallels the filing requirements governing purchase money 
secured lenders under [former Article 9] § 9-312(3)”). 
83 U.C.C. § 9-114 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999). 
430 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:413 
had removed the priority question from Article 2, placing it in-
stead within the scope of Article 9, effectively vitiating the other 
section 2-326(3) exceptions.84 Despite the confusion, courts and 
commentators held that the most feasible interpretation of sec-
tion 9-114 was to restrict its application to situations where fil-
ing a financing statement was the only effective method for a 
consignor to assert priority over competing creditors.85 
C. “Sale or Return” v. “Consignment Intended as Security” 
Another area of confusion regarding consignments with 
which courts struggled was whether the consignment agreement 
was a “sale or return” or a “consignment intended as security.”86 
Former section 1-201(b)(37) provided that the reservation of title 
by a consignor was not a security interest in consigned good unless 
the consignment was intended as security.87 And section 9-
102(2) stated that Article 9 governed “security interest created 
by contract including ... consignment intended as security.”88 
Consequently, if the consigned goods were intended as security 
Article 9, rather than Article 2, would apply.89 The jurispruden-
tial confusion centered on how to determine whether a consign-
ment was a “sale or return,” rather than a “consignment intended 
as security.”90 
                                                                                                                        
84 In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd., 147 B.R. at 149–50 (holding that the 
section 9-114 exception only applies if neither of the other two 2-326 excep-
tions do not apply); BFC Chems., Inc. v. Smith-Douglass, Inc., 46 B.R. 1009, 
1019–20 (E.D.N.C. 1985). 
85 BFC Chems., Inc., 46 B.R. at 1019–20; In re State St. Auto Sales, Inc., 81 
B.R. at 218. 
86 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 63–66; see Barber v. McCord Auto Supply, 
Inc. (In re Pearson Indus., Inc.), 47 B.R. 914, 927 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992) (noting 
that “[t]he problem of whether a particular transaction is a ‘sale or return’ or 
a ‘consignment’ transaction in which the seller retained title is one that has 
plagued the courts for years. The problem has been complicated by the fact 
that some sellers have drawn deliberately ambiguous agreements.”). 
87 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(37) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
amended 1999). 
88 Id. § 9-102(2) (1999). 
89 Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 
2d 1240, 1244 (Ala. 1983). 
90 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 63–66. 
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Courts formulated various tests to ascertain whether a 
consignment was a “sale or return” rather than a “consignment 
intended as security.”91 The most predominant tests involved 
examining the facts and circumstances surrounding the transac-
tions to construe the parties intentions with a goal towards as-
certaining if the transaction involved an agency relationship 
traditionally associated with consignments or an outright sale 
on a secured basis.92 Some courts found that a consignment was 
really a security interest securing an obligation if the consignee 
was obligated to purchase the goods if it could not resell them.93 
These courts reasoned that a true consignment consists of an 
agency relationship with the consignor—the principal—at all 
times retaining control of the consigned goods.94 Conversely, if 
the consignee was required to purchase the item, it became the 
owner to whom title was transferred.95 As such, the consignor’s 
interest in the consigned goods was at best relegated to that of an 
enforceable security interest, provided it had complied with the 
attachment provisions of Article 9.96 Thus, Article 9, not Article 
2, governed such transactions.97 
Other courts applied an all-inclusive approach by analyz-
ing the economic realities of the transactions to determine the 
intent of the consignment parties.98 Intent was determined by an 
objective standard that assessed the economic realities of the trans-
action by analyzing who retained control of the consigned goods, 
whether the goods were commingled with goods owned by the 
consignee, and which party set the price for the consigned goods.99 
                                                                                                                        
91 Id. 
92 Id.; see Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244. 
93 Edmonson v. Caldwell (In re Phippens), 4 B.R. 155, 158–59 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. 1980). 
94 Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244. 
95 Id. (concluding that that the consignment agreement was “intended as a 
security interest” noting that the agreement provided that each shipment of 
consigned goods was described as a “purchase agreement”). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide Jewelry Co.), 75 B.R. 969, 
977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
99 Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244–45; In re Ide 
Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. at 977. 
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Courts also focused on the economic function of the consignment.100 
Factors supporting the existence of a true consignment included: 
(1) the consignor retaining control of the price at which the con-
signed goods were sold; (2) the consignor retaining the right to 
recall the goods; (3) the consignee only having the authority to 
sell consigned goods upon the express consent of the consignor; 
(4) the consignee’s payment being in the form of a commission 
rather than a profit; and (5) the storing of the consigned goods 
separate from the consignee’s inventory.101 In contrast, factors sup-
porting the existence of a consignment as a security interest 
involved the consignee: (1) having the right to set the price of the 
consigned good; (2) commingling the proceeds generated from 
the sale of consigned goods with proceeds from the sale of its own 
inventory; and (3) mixing the consigned goods with its own inven-
tory; and it involved the consignor: (1) billing the consignee for 
the goods once the goods were shipped to the consignee and (2) pur-
porting to retain a security interest in the consigned goods.102 
In GECC v. Strickland Division of Rebel Lumber Company, 
the Supreme Court of Alabama used the all-inclusive approach 
in concluding that a purported consignment was really a consign-
ment intended as a security interest after reviewing the consign-
ment agreement, which the court stated contained certain indicia 
that supported its finding.103 The agreement provided that the con-
signee “was allowed to keep whatever profit he was able to charge 
over the wholesale price and he was absolutely obligated to pay 
[the consignor] a 5% upcharge even if he was unable to sell the 
[consigned goods].”104 The agreement also described each ship-
ment as a “purchase agreement.”105 The court concluded that the 
consignee was not acting as an agent of the consignor, “but, to 
the contrary, [the indicia] supported a finding that ... the con-
signment agreement was the functional equivalent” of a floor 
plan arrangement.106 
                                                                                                                        
100 Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244–45; In re Ide 
Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. at 978. 
101 In re Ide Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. at 969, 978. 
102 Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244–45; In re Ide 
Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. at 978.  
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IV. UCC REVISED ARTICLE 9 TREATMENT OF CONSIGNMENT LAW 
A. Introduction 
In response to persistent criticism that section 2-326 was 
not a model of clarity, in 1999, the UCC revised Articles 1, 2, and 9 
with a goal towards providing greater clarity and uniformity to 
the law of consignments.107 The 1999 revisions sought to clarify 
section 2-326 “in most cases without changing the rights of the 
creditors of the consignee.”108 The UCC removed commercial con-
signments from section 2-326, placing them instead within the 
scope of Article 9, provided they satisfied the Article 9 consign-
ment definition found in section 9-102(a)(20).109 Comment 4 to 
Revised Article 2-326 provides that, “[c]ertain true consignments 
were dealt with in former sections 2-326(3) and 9-114. These 
provisions have been deleted and have been replaced by new 
provisions in Article 9.”110 
Section 9-102 (a) (2) provides a comprehensive definition 
for consignments that incorporates much of the former section 2-
326 provisions.111 The section defines an Article 9 consignment 
as “a transaction ... in which a person delivers goods to a mer-
chant for the purpose of sale” and: 
(A) The merchant: 
(1) Deals in goods of that kind under a name other than 
the name of the person making delivery; 
(2) Is not an auctioneer; and  
(3) Is not generally known by its creditors to be substan-
tially engaged in selling the goods of others; 
(B) With respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the 
goods is $1,000 or more at the time of delivery; 
                                                                                                                        
107 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 1. 
108 Id. 
109 In re Haley & Steele, No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. 2005); see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW 
§ 22-4 at 1166 (6th ed. 2010) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW] 
(stating that “the combination of 9-102(a)(20) and 1-201(b)(35) has moved almost 
all commercial consignments into Article 9—at least for most purposes.”); see 
also Excel Bank v. Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, 290 S.W.3d 801, 804–05 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
110 U.C.C. § 2-326 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
111 Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 805. 
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(C) The goods are not consumer goods immediately before de-
livery; and 
(D) The transaction does not create a security interest that se-
cures an obligation.112 
Like former section 2-326, revised section 9-102(a)(20) 
was adopted to protect creditors from hidden liens resulting 
from undisclosed consignment agreements.113 Official Comment 
2 to section 9-319 states that, “[i]nsofar as creditors of the con-
signee are concerned, this Article to a considerable extent refor-
mulates the former law, which appeared in former sections 2-326 
and 9-114, without changing the results.”114 For example, sec-
tion 9-102(a)(20)(A)(i) mirrors the former 2-326(3) provision that 
required that the consignee to which the goods are delivered 
deal in goods of that kind in a name other than the consignor.115 
And section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) mirrors the “generally known by 
creditors” requirement in former section 2-326(3)(b).116 
However, two primary distinctions exist between former 
2-326 and current 9-102(a)(20). Former section 2-326 protected 
consignors against consignee creditor claims if the state had a 
sign law and the consignee posted a sign notifying parties of its 
consignment practices, or if the consignor complied with section 
9-114.117 But section 9-102(a)(20) does not provide for such pro-
tections; instead, it requires the consigner to file a financing state-
ment to be shielded from claims of a consignee’s creditors.118 
Section 9-102(a)(20) also differs from former section 2-326 with 
                                                                                                                        
112 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
113 Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 807; French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey 
Creations, LLC (In re Downey Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 469 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ind. 2009). 
114 U.C.C. § 9-319 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
115 Id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(i). 
116 Id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii); see Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 806. 
117 U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(a) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 
1999); see Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 807 (noting that “[t]he primary differ-
ence after the 1999 revisions is that consignors may no longer rely on notice 
through the posting of signs and/or written notifications to other creditors, 
see former §§ 2-326(3) & 9-114, and they must now file a financing statement 
to protect their interests, see §§§ 9-103(d), 9-310, & 9-311.”) 
118 See Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 807 (noting that “drafters of the UCC ... 
chose to remove the additional provisions that allowed consignors to protect 
their interests through actual and constructive notice and, instead, required 
them to file a UCC financing statement to protect their interest”). 
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its addition of subsections B and C, both of which statutorily 
“exclude transactions for which filing would be inappropriate or 
of insufficient benefit to justify the costs.”119 And another differ-
ence is that section 9-102(a)(20)(D) specifically provides that 
consignments “intended as security interest” are not Article 9 
consignments.120 
B. Article 9 Consignments 
1. Consignors’ Interests in Consigned Goods 
Consignors whose consignment agreements qualify as Ar-
ticle 9 consignments under 9-102(a)(20) must comply with Article 9 
perfection and priority rules to prevail against competing secured 
parties that are creditors of the consignee.121 Section 1-201(b)(35) 
facilitates a consignor’s compliance with Article 9 by providing 
that a consignor’s interest in consigned goods is a security interest; 
however, the security interest designation does not change the 
relationship between the consignor and consignee.122 And section 
9-103(d) provides that the security interest is a purchase money 
security interest.123 A consignor can best protect its interest by 
filing a financing statement to perfect its interest.124 And whether it 
files a financing statement dictates its rights vis-à-vis the con-
signee’s creditors.125 
                                                                                                                        
119 Id. at 805. 
120 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(D) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
121 Georgetown Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Serv. Corp. (In re Georgetown 
Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004) (noting that “most of the 
law concerning consignment transactions was governed by Article 2,” but that 
after the revisions, Article 9 provisions govern most consignments).  
122 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see IPC 
(USA), Inc. v. Ellis (In re Pettit Oil Co.), 575 B.R. 905, 911 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2017); In re Georgetown Steel Co., 318 B.R. at 356. 
123 U.C.C. § 9-103(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see also 
In re Pettit Oil Co., 575 B.R. at 907; Arthur Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v. 
Stuphen E. Corp., 914 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
124 Arthur Glick Truck Sales, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 541; TSA Stores, Inc. v. M 
J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565 B.R. 292, 298–99 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2017). 
125 In re Pettit Oil Co., 575 B.R. at 911; Arthur Glick Truck Sales, 914 F. 
Supp. 2d at 541. 
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a. The Legal Status of an Unperfected Consignor 
If a consignor does not perfect its security interest, section 
9-319(a), which was adopted as part of the 1999 revisions, provides 
that that consignee is deemed to have the rights and title of the 
consignor “for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, 
and purchasers for value of goods from, a consignee.”126 Even 
though as between the consignor and consignee the consignor re-
mains the owner of the goods, section 9-319(a) grants the consignee 
the rights and title of the consignor to transfer interests in the goods 
to its creditors.127 Section 9-319(a) grants those rights to the con-
signee’ creditors to protect them from “undisclosed consignment 
arrangements with the consignee that create secret liens.”128 
Effectively, section 9-319(a) creates a legal fiction that en-
ables the consignee’s creditors such as secured parties and judi-
cial lien creditors to attach their interests to the consigned goods 
as if the consignee possessed title to the goods.129 The consignee 
acquires those rights even though as between the consignor and 
consignee, the consignee only has limited rights.130 Consequently, 
                                                                                                                        
126 U.C.C. § 9-319(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM’N 2017). Official Com-
ment 2 to 9-319(a) explicitly indicates that the consignee has such rights if 
the consignor is unperfected. Id. at cmt. 2; see also In re Pettit Oil Co., 575 B.R. at 
910; Arthur Glick Truck Sales, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (holding that once the con-
signment transaction is executed, the consignee is deemed to have the rights 
and title of the consignor for purposes of determining the rights of its creditors un-
less the consignor has filed a financing statement perfecting its security interest). 
127 Official Comment 2 provides that the consignee acquires the rights and 
title of the consignor “even though, as between the parties, [consignor and 
consignee], it purchases a limited interest in the goods (as would be the case 
in a true consignment, under which the consignee acquires only the interest 
of a bailee).” U.C.C. § 9-319 cmt. 2. 
128 In re Pettit Oil Co., 575 B.R. at 910. 
129 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). The 
Official Comment 6 to section 9-203 provides that “[a] debtor’s limited rights 
in collateral, short of full ownership, are sufficient for a security interest to 
attach.” Id. § 9-203 cmt. 6; see In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2002) (stating that “[t]his fiction allows the consignee’s creditors to attach 
the consigned goods as if the consignee actually had title to the goods”); Auto. 
Fin. Corp. v. Cornejo, No. DO44553, 2005 WL 1349904, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 8, 2005). 
130 Cornejo, 2005 WL 1349904, at *4; Fariba v. Dealer Servs. Corp., 100 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
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the consignee’s creditors can attach judicial liens and security 
interests to consigned goods “while the goods are in the posses-
sion of the consignee.”131 
One question that has arisen concerning section 9-319 is 
whether the termination of a consignment agreement “insulates 
the consigned goods from the reach of the consignee’s creditors if 
the consignor’s interest is unperfected.”132 The answer depends 
on whether the consignee created a security interest in, or a lien 
attached to the consigned goods before the goods were returned 
to the consignor.133 In In re Valley Media, the bankruptcy court 
for the District of Delaware found that where the consignment 
agreements were terminated prepetition, the debtor-in-possession 
did not have any rights to exercise its powers under section 544 
(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code.134 In response to In re Valley Media, 
the PEB Commentary proposed draft provides the following: 
The termination of a consignment agreement does not ipso facto 
cause a “consignee” to lose its status as such, nor does it insulate 
the consigned goods from the reach of the consignee’s creditors if 
the consignor’s interest is unperfected. The suggestion to the 
contrary in In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2002), is incorrect.135 
The proposed commentary clarifies that “[a]fter the [con-
signed] goods have been returned to the consignor, the consignee 
loses all rights to the goods and so no longer can encumber them 
by creating a security interest. Nor can the consignee’s creditors 
acquire a judicial lien on the goods after that time.” 136 However, 
the proposal emphasizes that creditors whose interests attach to 
consigned goods while they are in the possession of the consignee 
remain enforceable even after the goods have been returned to 
the consignor, even though the consignee no longer possesses the 
goods and no longer has the rights and title of the consignor.137 
                                                                                                                        
131 Fariba, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 226. 
132 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 5 n.35. 
133 Id. at 5–6. 
134 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 142–43. 
135 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 5 n.35. 
136 Id. at 5–6. 
137 Id. at 6. 
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The PEB proposes amending Official Comment 2 to 9-319 to in-
clude the following: 
The termination of a consignment agreement does not ipso facto 
cause the consignee to lose its status as such, nor does it de-
prive the consignee of the deemed rights and title provided by 
subsection (a). Return of the goods to the consignor causes the 
consignee to lose its deemed rights and title, but it does not dis-
charge a security interest or judicial lien that attached while 
the consignee was in possession.138 
b. The Legal Status of a Perfected Consignor 
Section 9-319(b) provides that law other than Article 9 
“determines the rights and title of a consignee” if the consignor 
has perfected its security interest and has priority under Article 
9.139 Most likely, the common law of bailment will govern the rights 
and titles of the consignee; and it would preclude consignee’s 
creditors from asserting claims against the consigned goods.140 
To best protect its interest, a consignor must perfect its interest 
by filing a financing statement before the delivery of the con-
signed goods to the consignee.141 In Arthur Glick Truck Sales, the 
federal district court for the Southern District of New York stated 
that a subsequent filing by the consignor after the execution of the 
consignment agreement did not prevent the consignee from trans-
ferring the consignor’s rights and title to the consignee’s credi-
tors.142 Even though the consignor subsequently filed a financing 
statement, the court emphasized that at the time of delivery of 
the consigned goods, the consignor’s purchase money security inter-
est was unperfected thereby triggering the operation of 9-319(a).143 
If a consignor timely files its financing statement, it will 
have priority over the consignee’s secured creditors if it complies 
with the applicable Article 9 priority rules.144 To assert priority 
                                                                                                                        
138 Id. at 7. 
139 U.C.C. § 9-319(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
140 Id. Section 9-319(b) also defers to the common law of bailment or other 
state law governing consignments.  
141 TSA Stores, Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565 
B.R. 292, 298–99 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). 
142 Arthur Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v. Stuphen E. Corp., 914 F. Supp. 2d 529, 
542 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 541.  
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against a competing secured creditor of the consignee, the consignor 
must comply with section 9-324(b), which requires that the con-
signor’s security interest be perfected and that the consignee’s 
creditor receive notice of the consignor’s interest before the con-
signee takes possession of the consigned goods.145 If the consignor 
complies with section 9-324(b), it will not only have priority in 
the consigned goods, but also in any identifiable cash proceeds 
received by the consignee on or before delivery of the consigned 
goods to a buyer, along with priority in certain noncash proceeds 
generated from the sale of the goods.146 
 The consignor’s perfected status will also grant it priority 
over judicial lien creditors since section 9-317(a)(1) provides that 
a perfected party has priority over a lien creditor.147 
2. Consignee’s Secured Creditors’ Interests in Consigned Goods 
a. Introduction 
A secured creditor’s interest in consigned goods of its 
debtor/consignee will be governed by Article 9 if the consignor 
has not perfected its security interest nor established priority under 
Article 9.148 But to prevail against a consignor, a secured creditor 
of the consignee must have a perfected security interest in the 
consigned good, which requires the creditor to attach and to per-
fect its security interest.149 
b. Attachment of Consigned Goods by a Consignee’s  
Secured Creditors 
A consignee’s creditor must attach its security interest to 
consigned goods pursuant to section 9-203 to obtain an enforceable 
                                                                                                                        
145 U.C.C. § 9-324(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see Liebzeit 
v. FVTS Acquisition Co. (In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co.), 465 B.R. 808, 
820 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012). 
146 U.C.C. § 9-324(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
147 Id. § 9-317(a); see Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly 
Galleries, LLC), 506 B.R. 600, 608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, No. 14CV3544(VB), 
2014 WL 7389901, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014). 
148 IPC (USA), Inc. v. Ellis (In re Pettit Oil Co.), 575 B.R. 905, 907 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2017); In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 506 B.R. at 605. 
149 U.C.C. § 9-309 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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security interest in them.150 Section 9-203 requires, among other 
things, that the debtor have rights in the collateral or power 
transfer rights and that the security agreement sufficiently de-
scribe the collateral securing the obligation.151 The section 9-
203(b)(2) “power to transfer” element of attachment is satisfied 
by section 9-319(a), which grants the consignee the power to 
transfer the rights and title of the consigned goods to its secured 
creditors while those goods are in its possession.152 
However, an issue has arisen whether section 9-319(a) is 
more than “merely an enabling provision that permits satisfaction 
of [section 9-203(b)(2)].”153 Specifically, can a consignee pursuant 
to section 9-319(a) grant a security interest in consigned goods 
even if the security agreement limits the collateral description to 
property owned by the debtor? Under section 9-203(b)(3)(A), a se-
cured creditor can only attach its security interest to goods cov-
ered by the collateral description in the security agreement.154 That 
provision arguably limits the consignee from granting a security 
interest in consigned goods if the security agreement between it 
and its secured creditor describe the collateral as only that prop-
erty owned by the debtor, since the debtor does not own the con-
signed goods.155 Some courts have found, however, that section 
9-319(a) enables a consignee to create a security interest in con-
signed goods even though the security agreement limits the de-
scription to property owned by the debtor.156 
The few courts that have addressed this issue are divided 
on whether section 9-319(a)’s grant of consignor’s rights and title 
to the consignee enables a consignee to grant a security interest 
in the consigned goods notwithstanding restrictive ownership 
language in a security agreement that might otherwise prevent 
                                                                                                                        
150 Id. § 9-203. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. § 9-203(b)(2). 
153 TSA Stores, Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565 
B.R. 292, 302 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). 
154 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
155 See Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC), 
No. 14CV3544(VB), 2014 WL 7389901, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014). 
156 See Woven Treasures, Inc. v. Hudson Capital, LLC, 46 So. 3d 905, 915 
(Ala. 2009). 
2019] UNTANGLING THE WEB OF CONSIGNMENT LAW 441 
attachment under section 9-203(b)(3)(A).157 In most of these cases, 
consignors have contended that section 9-319(a) is inapplicable 
because a consignee’s creditors cannot attach their security in-
terests to the consigned goods where their security agreements 
describe the collateral as only that property owned by the debtor.158 
However, most of the courts that have addressed this issue have 
found the consignors’ arguments unpersuasive.159 These courts 
have emphasized section 9-319(a)’s language, which grants the 
consignee the rights and title of the consignor enabling it to cre-
ate a security interest in such goods despite the restrictive own-
ership language in their security agreements.160 
In Woven Treasures, Inc., the consignor contended that 
section 9-319(a) was inapplicable since the security agreement 
described the collateral as “merchandise” and it defined “mer-
chandise” as property owned by the consignee.161 The Supreme 
Court of Alabama rejected the consignor’s argument emphasiz-
ing that under section 9-319(a) the consignee is “deemed to have 
rights and title to the goods identical to those the consignor had,” 
and that the definition of “own” includes rightfully possessing prop-
erty.162 The court concluded that TSR Imports as a consignee 
rightfully possessed the consigned goods thereby enabling it to 
grant a security interest to its secured creditor.163 And in Sensient 
Flavors, LLC, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that section 
                                                                                                                        
157 In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 565 B.R. at 304; Woven Treasures, Inc., 46 
So. 3d at 915; Sensient Flavors, LLC v. Crossroads Debt, LLC, No. 302323, 2013 
WL 5857604, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2013). But see In re Salander-O’Reilly 
Galleries, LLC, 2014 WL 7389901, at *3–4 (holding that Section 9-319(a) does 
not grant a consignee the power to grant a security interest in consigned goods to 
its secured creditor if the security agreement describes the collateral as only 
that property owned by the consignee).  
158 In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 565 B.R. at 303; Woven Treasures, Inc., 46 
So. 3d at 915. But see In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 2014 WL 7389901, 
at *3. 
159 In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 565 B.R. at 304; Woven Treasures, Inc., 46 
So. 3d. at 915. 
160 In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 565 B.R. at 304; Woven Treasures, Inc., 46 
So. 3d at 915. 
161 Woven Treasures, Inc., 46 So. 3d at 915. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
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9-319(a) “allows a consignee to grant a security interest in prop-
erty that it does not own.”164 
At least one court has found, however, that a consignee’s 
creditor’s security interest did not attach to consigned goods where 
the collateral description in the security agreement limited the 
property to goods owned by the consignee.165 In In re Salander-
O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, a federal district court for the Southern 
District of New York found that secured creditor’s security in-
terest did not attach to consigned goods because the collateral 
description of the loan agreement between consignee/debtor and 
the bank only granted the bank a security interest in goods owned 
or hereinafter acquired by the consignee/debtor.166 The case was 
on appeal from the bankruptcy court, which had denied the con-
signor’s summary judgment motion in which it argued that the 
collateral description in the loan agreement only granted the bank a 
security interest in the artwork owned by the consignee.167 
The federal district court agreed with the consignor’s ar-
gument.168 It held that the plain language of the security 
agreement provided that a security interest would attach only to 
personal property “owned or thereafter owned” by the consignee, 
and since the consignor, not the consignee, was the owner of the 
consigned goods, the secured creditor could not attach its lien to 
the good.169 In arriving at this conclusion, the court interpreted 
the term “hereafter acquired” to include only those goods that 
the debtor acquired through ownership, instead of through other 
means, such as consignment, entrustment, or the like.170 The 
court’s ruling centered on contract interpretation, which the 
court concluded was governed by the plain meaning of the con-
tract.171 According to the court, the plain meaning of the con-
tract clearly indicated that the parties’ intent was only to grant 
                                                                                                                        
164 Sensient Flavors, LLC v. Crossroads Debt, LLC, No. 302323, 2013 WL 
5857604, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2013). 
165 Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC), 
506 B.R. 600, 610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, No. 14CV3544(VB), 2014 WL 






171 Id. at *3. 
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the bank a security interest in the personal property that its 
debtor/consignee owned.172 
The court did not address, however, whether the consign-
ment transaction was an Article 9 consignment, so the opinion 
did not contain a discussion concerning the legal scope of section 
9-319(a).173 The secured creditor had assigned its interest to the 
bankruptcy trustee, which had filed a partial summary judgment 
motion with the bankruptcy court alleging that the consignment 
agreement satisfied the various attributes of section 9-102(a)(20); 
but the court found that it had failed to “provide any evidentiary 
support for these allegations.”174 The bankruptcy court had de-
nied the trustee’s partial summary judgment motion finding that 
material issues of fact existed that precluded judgment for the 
trustee.175 The court concluded that the trustee, at trial, would 
have the burden of proof with regard to each attribute enumer-
ated in 9-102(a)(20).176 The trustee did not appeal the bankruptcy 
court ruling, and the federal district court’s holding was limited 
to remanding the case to the bankruptcy court with instructions 
to enter summary judgment in favor of the consignor.177 
In In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., the bankruptcy court for the 
District of Delaware found the reasoning in In re Salander-O’Reilly 
Galleries, LLC to be unpersuasive.178 In the case, a secured cred-
itor of the consignee filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
arguing that the consignment qualified as an Article 9 consignment 
thereby granting it priority because consignor’s security interest 
was unperfected.179 The secured creditor contended that the con-
signee/debtor “would be deemed to have an interest in consigned 
                                                                                                                        
172 Id. at *3–4. In a footnote to the case, the court also indicated that ex-
trinsic evidence proffered by the consignor proved that the parties’ that the loan 
be secured only with “dealer owned inventory,” and the court stated that the 
extrinsic evidence “provides an alternative basis for [its] ruling.” Id. at *5 n.3. 
173 Id. at *1–5. 
174 Id. at *3. The trustee did not rely on its status as a judicial lien creditor 
to assert its claim to the consigned goods. In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, 
LLC., 506 B.R. at 607. The court indicated that the consignment agreement 
had expired apparently prepetition. Id. at 607, 612. 
175 Id. at 607. 
176 Id. at 609. 
177 In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 2014 WL 7389901, at *5. 
178 TSA Stores, Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565 
B.R. 292, 304 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). 
179 Id. at 299. 
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goods sufficient to grant a security interest to [it] pursuant to sec-
tion 9-319(a).”180 Relying on the holding in In re Salander-
O’Reilly Galleries, LLC the consignor in In re TSAWD Holdings 
argued that the consignee’s secured party had not created a se-
curity interest in the consigned goods because the security agree-
ment defined the collateral as “property owned by the Debtors 
[consignees].”181 The court rejected the consignor’s argument noting 
that Salander-O’Reilly was distinguishable because it “did not ad-
dress the issue of material fact (as to whether the consignment 
agreement was governed by the UCC),” which was the issue before 
the court in In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.182 The court also denied 
the secured creditors motion for partial summary judgment finding 
that the “question of whether the UCC is applicable raises a dis-
puted issue of material fact which precludes partial judgment on 
the pleadings.”183 
The court in In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc. was incorrect in 
rejecting the consignor’s argument. Contrary to the court’s holding, 
the In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC decision is persuasive. 
Even if a consignment is governed by Article 9, section 9-319(a) 
should not be interpreted as granting a consignee the power to 
create a security interest in consigned goods not covered by the 
security agreement description. Courts that have found otherwise 
have misconstrued section 9-319(a). While the PEB Draft Com-
mentary indicates that a consignee has “the rights in and the 
power to transfer the consigned goods,” it emphasizes that a 
security interest only becomes enforceable after the “other require-
ments of section 9-203(b) [have been] satisfied.”184 The signifi-
cance of section 9-319(a) should not be understated; but its scope 
in relation to the rights of secured creditors of a consignee is 
limited to that of an enabling provision, which permits the satis-
faction of section 9-203(b)(2). It does not vitiate the requirement of 
section 9-203(b)(3), which provides that a security agreement de-
scription must cover the consigned goods to create an enforceable 
security interest.185 A security agreement is a contract subject to 
                                                                                                                        
180 Id. at 304. 
181 Id. at 303. 
182 Id. at 304. 
183 Id. 
184 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 6. 
185 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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the principles of contract law.186 And absent an ambiguity in the 
contract, a description that limits property to that owned by the 
consignee plainly signifies the parties’ intent not to grant a security 
interest in consigned goods in the possession of the consignee.187 
Nonetheless, the court’s ruling in In re Salander-O’Reilly 
Galleries, LLC is problematic for secured lenders, which often 
describe collateral as inventory “whether now owned and hereaf-
ter acquired.”188 After the ruling, secured lenders will need to 
eliminate the “ownership” reference in security agreements and 
financing statement descriptions to reach consigned goods.189 
Clarks’ Secured Transactions Monthly suggests that secured 
creditors considering describing the collateral in the financings 
statement as follows: “All assets in which the debtor now has or 
hereafter acquires rights or the power to transfer rights,” and 
describing the collateral in the security agreement as “all inven-
tory, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles, whether the 
debtor currently has or hereafter acquires rights (or the power to 
transfer rights) in the foregoing.”190 
c. Perfection of, and Priority in Consigned Goods by  
Consignee’s Secured Creditors 
Even if a consignee’s creditor successfully attaches its se-
curity interest to the consigned goods, it must perfect its security 
interest to prevail against an unperfected consignor.191 One com-
mon means of perfection is by filing a financing statement.192 To 
avoid the result reached in In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, 
LLC, a secured creditor should avoid restrictive collateral descrip-
tions in its financing statement that limit collateral to property 
                                                                                                                        
186 Id. § 9-204(d). 
187 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 136 (7th ed. 2014). 
188 New York Consignment Case Illustrates Danger of After Acquired Prop-
erty Clauses, 33 CLARKS’ SECURED TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY NO. 6, at 1 (2017). 
189 Id. at 2. 
190 Id. 
191 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). If the 
consignee’s creditor is unperfected then priority will be determined based on 
which party attached first, in which case the consignor will prevail since its 
interest is automatic under Section 1-201(b)(35). See id. § 9-322(a)(3). 
192 See TSA Stores Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 
565 B.R. 292, 299 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). 
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owned by the consignee. Assuming its financing statement suffi-
ciently describes the consigned goods, a consignee’s creditor will 
have priority over an unperfected consignor pursuant to section 
9-322(a)(2), which grants priority to a perfected secured creditor 
over an unperfected one.193 
3. Judicial Lien Creditors’ Attachment of Consigned Goods 
Section 9-319(a) applies also to judicial lien creditors such 
as bankruptcy trustees, which can attach liens to consigned goods 
as hypothetical lien creditors pursuant to section 544(a)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.194 In effect, “[t]he trustee hypothetically extends 
credit to the debtor at the time of [bankruptcy petition] filing and, 
at that moment, obtains a judicial lien on all property in which the 
debtor has any interest that could be reached by a creditor.”195 
Moreover, a debtor-in-possession assumes the rights of the hypo-
thetical lien creditor under section 544(a)(1) to act for the benefit 
of the bankruptcy’s estate creditors, even though in its role as the 
consignee, it does not have any power to avoid an unperfected secu-
rity interest of its consignor.196 The knowledge of a pre-petition 
debtor regarding the existence of consignment arrangements is 
not imputed to a debtor-in-possession in a bankruptcy.197 
Section 9-317(a)(2) grants lien creditors such as bankruptcy 
trustees priority over unperfected security interest, thereby allowing 
                                                                                                                        
193 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
194 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2012); see Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-
O’Reilly Galleries, LLC), 475 B.R. 9, 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
195 In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 475 B.R. at 22 (quoting Musso 
v. Ostashko, 468 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
196 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey 
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009) (noting that Article 9 
is only relevant to the consignee’s dispute because its Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
filing places it in the “shoes of a hypothetical lien creditor”); see also In re Valley 
Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 132 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); In re G.S. Distribution, 331 
B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that a “consignor must ordinarily file 
a financing statement in order to protect its interest in the property from the 
claims of a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession acting on behalf of the es-
tate’s creditors under the ‘strong arm powers’ of § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
197 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 132; see ATG Aerospace, Inc. v. 
High-Line Aviation Ltd. (In re High-Line Aviation, Inc.), 149 B.R. 730, 739 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1992). 
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them to avoid a consignor’s unperfected security interest.198 It is 
worth noting that the ruling in In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, 
LLC would not affect judicial lien creditors since their interests 
in the consigned goods is statutorily, not contract, based.199 How-
ever, neither a trustee nor a debtor-in-possession can assert the 
avoidance powers under section 544(a)(1) if the consigned goods 
have been returned to the consignor before the petition filing.200 
To protect their interests against trustees and debtors-in-
possession asserting avoidance powers under section 544(a)(1), 
consignors need to perfect their security interest.201 
V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ARTICLE 9 CONSIGNMENT LAW 
A. Introduction 
As courts have begun to apply Revised Article 9 to determine 
whether a consignee’s creditors can assert claims to consigned 
goods they continue to wrestle with some of the same issues courts 
encountered when analyzing whether consignments qualified as 
“sale and return” transactions under former section 2-326.202 In 
large part, courts are confronted with many of the same issues 
because Article 9, in many respects, is a reformulation of former 
section 2-326. In addition, the Article 9 revisions have generated 
new issues. For the most part, the issues fall generally into one 
of the following three categories: (1) What qualifies as an Article 
                                                                                                                        
198 U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see 
Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC), 506 B.R. 
600, 606 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, No. 14CV3544(VB), 2014 WL 7389901, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014). 
199 The trustee did not rely on its status as a judicial lien creditor to assert 
its claim to the consigned goods. In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 506 
B.R. at 607. The court indicated that the consignment agreement had expired 
apparently pre-petition. Id. at 607, 612. 
200 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 6; see also In re Salander-
O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 506 B.R. at 612 (allowing the trustee to assert an 
interest in consigned goods even though the consignment expired pre-petition, 
because the trustee was not seeking to avoid the consignor’s interest pursu-
ant to the strong arm clause of section 544(a)(1), but rather asserting its in-
terest as an assignee of one of the consignee’s secured creditors whose security 
interest had attached to the consigned goods prior to the petition filing). 
201 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey 
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 467 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009). 
202 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 1. 
448 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:413 
9 consignment;203 (2) Who has the burden of proving that a con-
signment agreement qualifies as an Article 9 consignment;204 and 
(3) What law governs if the consignment does not qualify as an 
Article 9 consignment.205 
Much of the confusion surrounding the first issue involves 
interpreting the various elements section 9-102(a)(20) in a man-
ner that most efficaciously serves the underlying goals the UCC 
sought to achieve in placing consignments within the scope of 
Article 9.206 The second issue concerning the burden of proof is 
one on which courts are also split.207 Former section 2-326 explic-
itly provided that the consignor had to prove it qualified for one of 
three section 2-326 exceptions to avoid claims of a consignee’s 
creditors.208 Revised Article 9 is silent on the issue, but the phrase-
ology of several of the section 9-102(a)(20) elements suggests that 
the burden is on the party seeking protection under the section.209 
The third issue concerning what law governs if the consignment 
does not qualify as an Article 9 consignment has confounded some 
courts, which have found that such consignments should be gov-
erned by revised section 2-326, even though Official Comment 4 
to that section explicitly states that true consignments dealt with 
under former section 2-326 have been replaced by new provisions 
in Article 9.210 
This section of the Article will examine post-1999 judicial 
treatment concerning each of the above-mentioned issues. 
B. What Qualifies as an Article 9 Consignment? 
Courts have been presented with the following issues con-
cerning whether a consignment agreement qualifies as an Arti-
cle 9 consignment: (1) Whether the goods have been delivered “to a 
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merchant for the purpose of sale;”211 (2) Whether the merchant 
“deals in goods of that kind under a name” other than the con-
signor;212 (3) Whether “it is not generally known by” the mer-
chant’s creditors that the merchant is “substantially engaged in 
selling the goods of others;”213 (4) Whether the consignment is a 
consumer consignment excluded from Article 9;214 and (5) Whether 
the transaction “create[s] a security interest that secures an ob-
ligation.”215 
1. Delivery to a “Merchant for the Purpose of Sale” 216 
To qualify as an Article 9 consignment the delivery of goods 
to the merchant must be for the purpose of sale.217 As such, true 
bailments are excluded from the scope of Article 9 consignments 
since bailment agreements do not allow the bailee to sell the good 
delivered.218 In In re Greenline Equipment, Inc., the bankruptcy 
court for the Northern District of Mississippi concluded that deliv-
ery of equipment to a merchant for storage with an occasional 
infrequent sale by the merchant to a third party was not a delivery 
“for the purpose of sale.”219 The owner of the goods, Foster Brothers, 
delivered its equipment for temporary storage, and on an infre-
quent basis, the equipment was purchased by a third party.220 
The court concluded that the delivery of goods at best involved a 
bailment agreement in which the identical thing delivered was 
returned after the purpose of the bailment had been fulfilled.221 
And it viewed the occasional infrequent sales as incidental, not 
as consignment sales.222 
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a. The Delivery of Raw Materials to Be Processed 
One recurring issue with which courts have been presented 
is whether the delivery of raw materials to a merchant that sub-
sequently incorporates the raw materials into a final product, either 
through manufacturing or processing, is a delivery “for the purpose 
of sale.”223 Generally, consignment agreements involving the deliv-
ery of raw material provide that the materials will be segregated 
from the merchant’s inventory until such time as the material is 
ready for processing.224 During its storage in a segregated area, 
the consignee is not obliged to pay for the goods.225 Only after the 
consignee moves the raw materials from the segregated area for 
processing or manufacturing is the consignee invoiced for the 
price of the materials it processes.226 
White and Summers have referred to these transactions 
as “quasi-consignments” and have stated the following regarding 
whether the delivery of raw materials is a “delivery to a mer-
chant for the purpose of sale”227: 
The definition of “consignment” requires that the goods be de-
livered “to a merchant for the purpose of sale.” If the goods 
are delivered for another purpose as well, such as milling or 
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processing, the transaction is a consignment nonetheless be-
cause a purpose of the delivery is “sale.”228 
And generally, courts have found that the delivery of raw 
materials is a delivery “for the purpose of sale.”229 Georgetown 
Steel is an oft-cited case in which the bankruptcy court for the Dis-
trict of South Carolina found that the delivery of HBI, a compo-
nent of steel, to the consignee, which processed it into steel, was 
a delivery for the purpose of sale, since the HBI was an integral 
component of the steel that the consignee sold to its customers.230 
In In re Georgetown Steel Co., LLC, the owner delivered the HBI 
to the consignee, which stored it in a segregated location for its own 
inventory and transferred it as needed for processing into steel.231 
On a weekly basis, the consignee would report its usage of HBI to 
the consignor and would pay the consignor for the amount it had 
consumed.232 In concluding that the delivery of raw materials 
was a delivery “for the purpose of sale,” the court referenced to 
both Official Comment 14 accompanying the Alabama version of 
the UCC, which mirrors the UCC Official Comment, and White and 
Summers noting that both sources contemplate that the delivery 
of such goods is a delivery for the “purpose of sale.”233 Official 
Comment 14 accompanying section 9-102(a)(20) provides that:  
The definition of “consignment” requires that goods be deliv-
ered “to a merchant for the purpose of sale.” If the goods are 
delivered for another purpose as well, such as milling or pro-
cessing, the transaction is a consignment nonetheless because 
a purpose of delivery is sale.234 
However, not all courts have followed the guidance pro-
vided in the Official Comments.235 In In re Excalibur Machine, 
the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
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found that the delivery of raw materials constituted a consignment 
transaction, but that the subsequent sale of the finished product 
by the merchant was a sales transaction governed by section 2-
401.236 The court held that a consignment agreement existed be-
tween the parties while the raw materials were in storage, but 
concluded that their relationship became that of debtor and creditor 
amounting to a sales transaction once the raw materials were 
transferred for processing.237 
In In re Excalibur Machine, the consignor delivered steel 
plates to be used in the consignee’s manufacturing process.238 Simi-
lar to other consignments involving the delivery of raw materi-
als, the consignee stored the steel plates in a segregated area until 
such time as it used them in the manufacturing process.239 Once 
the steel plates were transported from the segregated area for pro-
cessing, the consignor invoiced the consignee for the consigned 
goods.240 Subsequently, the consignee processed the steel plates into 
a finished product, which it sold on account to its customers.241 The 
consignor claimed a priority interest in the accounts receivables.242 
The consignment agreement was entitled a “Consignment 
Security Agreement,” which granted the consignor a “continuing 
security interest in the Consigned Goods.”243 The consignor also 
filed a financing statement that expanded the collateral descrip-
tion to include consigned goods, including, but not limited to, the 
consigned steel plates.244 The court narrowly interpreted the “con-
signed goods” description in the consignment security agreement 
to include only the raw materials.245 Even though the court rec-
ognized that the financing statement description “attempted to 
expand the scope” of the consigned goods to include the finished 
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product, it emphasized that the language of the security agreement, 
not the financing statement, determined the parties’ intent.246 
And the court viewed the collateral description in the security 
agreement as intending only to grant a security interest in the 
“raw material that remained in segregated storage on the [con-
signee’s] premises and the proceeds of any sale of those raw ma-
terials to third parties.”247 
Accordingly, the court found that the relationship between 
the parties “changed when [the consignee] took the raw steel into 
its facility [for processing].”248 Once the steel was transferred for 
processing a “relationship of debtor and creditor existed, rather 
than that of consignor and consignee” because at that point “there 
was an agreement to pay a specific amount” resulting in a sale.249 
The court concluded that once the consignee incorporated the 
steel plates into its product, it was no longer segregated, and that 
the consignee handled the purchased steel plate as its own.250 
And the purchased steel plates became the property of the con-
signee subject to claims of its creditors.251 The court proceeded to 
apply Article 2, which governs the sale of goods, noting that under 
New York UCC section 2-401, title passes from the seller to a buyer 
once “the seller completes its performance with respect to physical 
delivery of the goods.”252 Emphasizing that the consignor’s per-
fected security interest was limited to the steel plates in the segre-
gated area, the court concluded that the consignor did not have 
an interest in accounts receivable proceeds that the consignee 
had received from the sale of the finished product.253 
It is confounding that the court concluded that the parties 
only intended to execute a consignment agreement with respect 
to the raw materials. By itself, the delivery of the raw materials 
could not qualify as a consignment arrangement.254 In a consign-
ment arrangement, the merchant to whom the goods are delivered 
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agrees to sell the delivered goods to a third party.255 The mer-
chant in Excalibur had no intention of selling the steel plates to 
third parties.256 Rather, the merchant and the owner of the steel 
plates intended that the merchant sell the finished product to 
third parties, which suggests that the parties intended the term 
“consigned goods” to include the finished product.257 
The court’s approach clearly undermines the goals of Article 
9 to provide greater clarity and uniformity regarding the respec-
tive rights of consignors and creditors of consignees.258 As required 
by Article 9, the consignor in In re Excalibur Mach. Co. dutifully 
filed its financing statement to protect its interest against the 
consignee’s creditors.259 Despite its diligence in filing, the con-
signor’s interest was subordinated to both the competing consignee 
creditor and the consignee, which was a debtor-in-possession.260 
In this respect, the court’s ruling provided a windfall to the both 
the debtor-in-possession and its secured creditor, while inequita-
bly penalizing the consignor.261 Article 9 consignment rules were 
devised to provide priority to consignees’ creditors when undis-
closed consignment agreements created secret liens on what ap-
peared to the creditors as consignee’s inventory.262 But no secret 
liens existed in this case.263 The consignor had filed a financing 
statement, which gave the consignee’s creditors notice of the 
consignment.264 The court’s subordination of the consignor’s inter-
est reflects a complete lack of appreciation for the legal frame-
work devised by Article 9 to protect the respective rights of the 
consignor and competing creditors of the consignee. 
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Another issue concerning the delivery of raw materials is 
whether the “purpose for sale” requirement is satisfied if the 
finished product is sold back to the consignor rather than to a third 
party. Section 9-102(a)(20) does not specifically require that the 
merchant sell the consigned goods to someone other than its owner, 
but the most sensical interpretation of the provision is that mer-
chant must sell the goods to a third party, rather than to the 
owner.265 By its very definition, consignments involve owners de-
livering goods to a merchant for resell to third parties.266 Owners 
consign their goods to merchants to secure a market in which to 
sell them, which indicates their intent to sell their goods to third 
parties, rather than back to themselves.267 
Generally, courts have found that the delivery of raw ma-
terials to be incorporated into a finished product to be sold back 
to the owner is not a consignment.268 Consistent with the judicial 
opinion, White and Summers have stated that: “If despite their 
processing and commingling, the goods are returned to the owner 
and not sold to a third person, the transaction is not a consign-
ment under 1999 Article 9 ....”269 
Courts have viewed these such transactions as true bail-
ments, not consignment transactions.270 In Citation, the bankruptcy 
court for the Northern District of Alabama found that a bailment 
contract existed between parties when the owner of steel deliv-
ered it to a manufacturer to produce airplane crankshafts with 
the instruction that all crankshafts produced were to be sold to 
the owner.271 The court emphasized that the merchant never 
purchased the raw materials and the agreement only allowed the 
merchant to sell the finished product back to the owner of the 
steel.272 And at all times, the title remained with the owner.273 
Even though variations of the term “consign” appeared sixty-eight 
times in the contract, the court stated, “that the term alone was 
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not ‘magical.’”274 The court found no evidence in the agreement 
that the intent of the parties was to create a consignment agree-
ment subject to the UCC.275 
But at least one court has found that the delivery of raw 
materials incorporated into a finished product that was sold back 
subsequently to the owner of the raw materials was a delivery 
“for the purpose of sale.”276 In Sensient Flavors, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals found that Sensient’s delivery of raw materials 
consisting of raw cherries, coloring, and flavoring to a Cherry 
Blossom with the understanding that the Cherry Blossom would 
process the raw materials and sell the finished product back to 
the Sensient involved a delivery “for the purpose of sale.”277 Sen-
sient maintained a weekly account of the costs of the delivered 
materials and setoff weekly from the purchase price of the finished 
product the price of the raw cherries, colorings, and flavorings 
that Cherry Blossom had purchased from Sensient.278 
In concluding that the cherries were delivered to the con-
signee “for the purpose of sale,” the court analogized the arrange-
ment between Sensient and Cherry Blossom to the consignment 
arrangement in Georgetown Steel in which a bankruptcy court 
found that the delivery of raw materials subsequently processed 
into a finished product and sold to third parties was a delivery 
“for the purpose of sale.”279 In its analogy, the court minimalized 
the most significant distinction between Georgetown and Sensient, 
the former involved the sale of the finished products to third 
parties, while the latter involved the consignee selling the fin-
ished product back to the consignor.280 The court diminished the 
distinction by stating that, “the cherries were delivered to Cherry 
Blossom for the purpose of sale, regardless of the fact that the sale 
was back to Sensient [the owner of the cherries].”281 
The court’s reliance on Georgetown Steel is misplaced. Hav-
ing mistakenly determined that the transaction was an Article 9 
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consignment, the court held that the consignee’s secured creditor 
had priority in the cherries, thereby subordinating the consignor’s 
unperfected security interest.282 The court should have analyzed 
the parties’ rights under the common law, which is essentially the 
law of bailment, which would have granted priority to the con-
signor.283 The court’s decision to include the transaction within 
the scope of Article 9 rendered an inequitable result inconsistent 
with the underlying policy goals of Article 9.284 
2. Merchant Deals in Goods of That Kind in a Name Other 
Than in the Name of the Person Making Delivery 
Section 9-102(a)(20) requires that the merchant to whom the 
goods are delivered deal in goods of that kind under a name other 
than in the name of the consignor.285 To satisfy the requirement, the 
party must prove that (1) the merchant deals in goods of that kind 
delivered to it; and (2) the merchant deals in those goods under a 
name other than the deliverer.286 Both requirements must be satis-
fied to qualify as an Article 9 consignment.287 If the merchant either 
does not deal in goods of the kind delivered or deals in goods of 
that kind in the name of the consignor, its creditors should rea-
sonably assume that the merchant lacks sufficient rights in the 
goods that it possesses.288 Either event places the merchant’s 
creditors on notice; thereby avoiding the problem of being misled by 
apparent ownership of goods held by the consignee.289 
a. Merchant Dealing in Goods of That Kind 
One issue that has arisen is whether a merchant to whom 
raw materials are delivered “deals in goods of that kind” since 
the final product the merchant sells is different than the raw 
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materials delivered to it.290 When confronted with this issue, 
courts have found that the inclusion of goods into a final product 
was sufficient to establish that the merchant “deals in goods of 
that kind.”291 In In re Georgetown Steel Company, the issue pre-
sented was whether the delivery of hot briquetted iron (“HBI”) to 
a merchant that planned to process it into steel satisfied the 
“deals in goods of that kind” requirement.292 The court found 
that the merchant satisfied the requirement noting that the HBI 
was typically considered part of the inventory of manufacturers 
like the consignee and that the HBI was an “integral component 
part of the [consignee’s] final product.”293 
b. Merchant Dealing in Goods Under a Name Other Than 
the Name of the Person Making Delivery 
The test for determining whether a merchant deals under 
a name other than the consignor is the same test courts applied 
when consignments were subject to former section 2-326.294 A party 
seeking protection under subsection 9-102(a)(20)(A)(i) must prove 
that the consignee was neither “completely enveloped”295 in, nor 
“completely identified”296 with, the consignor’s business “that po-
tential creditors would necessarily assume that the business was 
that of the consignor solely.”297 In In re G.S. Distribution, the bank-
ruptcy court for the Southern District of New York noted the pur-
pose of the subsection by stating: 
This subsection [9-102(a)(20)(A)(i)] is designed to carry out 
one of the purposes of making consignments subject to Article 
9, which is to ensure that a consignee’s general creditors are 
put on notice of the consignor’s interest in the consigned prop-
erty, and ‘to protect general creditors of the consignee from claims 
of consignors that have undisclosed consignment arrangements 
                                                                                                                        
290 Georgetown Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown 
Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 352, 358 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004). 
291 Id. at 358. 
292 Id. at 358–59. 
293 Id. 
294 See supra Part III. 
295 In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 562 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
296 Id. 
297 Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R. 
340, 343 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (quoting Mann v. Clark Oil and Refining Corp., 
302 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (D.C.E.D.Mo. 1969), aff’d, 425 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1970)). 
2019] UNTANGLING THE WEB OF CONSIGNMENT LAW 459 
with the consignee that create secret liens in the inventory.’ 
Where a consignee operates only under the name of the consignor, 
the U.C.C. assumes that the consignee’s general creditors will 
be on notice of the consignment and will not be misled into be-
lieving that the merchant has ownership of the inventory in 
its possession.298 
In In re G.S. Distribution, the court found section 9-102 
(a)(20)(A)(i) was not satisfied because the consignee was completely 
enveloped in the consignor’s business because it “held itself out to 
the public as a [consignor] store.”299 The consignee only sold the 
goods of the consignor, and it only sold goods under the name of 
the consignor.300 The court noted, however, that a consignee is not 
completely enveloped in its consignor’s business if the consignee 
sells goods of other suppliers in addition to those of the consignor or 
if it is known that the consignee is a separate entity.301 
Under former section 2-326, courts found that merchants 
selling goods under the name of the consignor, while also selling 
similar goods under their own name, were doing business under 
a name other than the consignor.302 They reasoned that since 
the consignee was selling similar goods under its own name, it 
was not completely enveloped by the consignors’ names; there-
fore, the consignee’s creditors could have reasonably concluded 
that consignee’s complete inventory of goods were owned by the 
consignee.303 Most likely, courts applying section 9-102(a)(20) 
will apply the same reasoning, since consignee’s ostensible own-
ership of consigned goods was the genesis underlying the UCC 
adoption of consignment rules to protect consignee’s creditors 
against undisclosed consignment arrangements.304 
3. Not Generally Known by its Creditors to be Substantially 
Engaged in Selling the Goods of Others 
Section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) provides that a transaction does 
not qualify as an Article 9 consignment if it is generally known 
                                                                                                                        
298 In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
299 Id. at 562 (alteration in original). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 In re Wicaco Mach. Corp. 49 B.R. at 343. 
303 Id. 
304 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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by the consignee’s creditors that the consignee is substantially 
engaged in the business of selling goods of others.305 The require-
ment was one of the former section 2-326(3) exceptions, but phrase-
ology in Article 9 differs; former section 2-326(3)(b) was phrased 
in the affirmative, while section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) is phrased in 
the negative.306 Under former section 2-326(3)(b), the consignor had 
to prove the consignee’s practices were generally known by its credi-
tors,307 while section 9-102 (a)(20)(A)(iii) requires a party to prove 
that the consignee’s practices were not generally known.308 The 
negative framing of the phraseology supports the contention that 
the party seeking protection under section 9-102(a)(20) has the bur-
den of proof, instead of placing the burden on the consignor, which is 
what former section 2-326(3) required.309 To satisfy the “generally 
known” requirement a party must prove that (1) the consignee is 
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, and (2) that the 
consignee’s practices are generally known by the creditors.310 
a. “Not Generally Known” Requirement311 
In interpreting section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii), courts continue 
to apply the standards adopted by those courts that dealt with 
the “generally known” requirement in former section 2-326.312 Like 
those earlier court opinions, courts applying section 9-102(a)(20) 
are split on whether a party can satisfy the “generally known” stan-
dard by merely proving that the competing creditor of the con-
signee has actual knowledge of the consignee’s practices.313 Some 
courts have found the “generally known” standard requires a party 
                                                                                                                        
305 Id. 
306 Compare id., with U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, amended 1999). 
307 See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
amended 1999). 
308 See Id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
309 Id. § 2-326(3). 
310 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey 
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 471 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009) (noting that even if 
actual knowledge by the consignee’s creditor was sufficient to satisfy the “generally 
known” test, the consignor had not proven that the consignee was substantially 
engaged in selling goods of others); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 124–25 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
311 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
312 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 472. 
313 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 124. 
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prove that a “majority” of creditors have actual knowledge of the 
consignee’s practices,314 while others have interpreted the stan-
dard to mean that only the competing creditor have actual knowl-
edge of such practices.315 
Those courts requiring a “majority” continue to hold that 
a “majority” refers to the number of creditors, not the amount of the 
consignee’s creditors’ claims.316 But recent courts have included 
within the category of creditors “unsecured claims from utility 
companies and other third-party suppliers of goods and services 
that may not know exactly what kind of business is conducted 
on the [merchant’s] premises.”317 However, courts have stated 
that general knowledge regarding custom in the industry has not 
been sufficient to satisfy the “generally known” test.318 
Courts finding that the “generally known” standard is sat-
isfied when the competing creditor has actual knowledge of the 
consignee’s practices have reasoned that a creditor with actual 
knowledge has no need of protection from secret liens because it 
was not misled by the consignee’s ostensible ownership of the con-
signed goods.319 In Fariba, the California Court of Appeals stated: 
“[S]ince the purpose of the notice exception is to ‘protect creditors 
from the “hidden” claim of the consignor, it should follow that a 
creditor of a consignee who has actual knowledge that the con-
signee is a consignee cannot claim the protection thereof.’”320 
                                                                                                                        
314 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 471; In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 
302 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that “the personal knowledge of 
a few protesting consignors [as creditors of the consignee] does not satisfy their 
burden of proof of what subjectively the other creditors generally knew or should 
have known about the exact nature of the debtor’s business activities.”) (addi-
tion for clarification); Rayfield Inv. Co. v. Kreps, 35 So.3d 63, 65–66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010) (rejecting the trial court’s reasoning that the consignor’s interest 
was superior to the perfected security interest of the consignee’s creditor since the 
creditor had knowledge that the goods in question were on consignment). 
315 Fariba v. Dealer Serv. Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 227–28 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
316 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 463 (citing Quaker City Iron 
Works v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R. 340, 344 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1984)). 
317 In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. at 788. 
318 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 471 (citing In re Wedlo Holding, 
Inc., 248 B.R. 336, 341–42 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). 
319 Fariba, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 227–28. 
320 Id. (quoting 3A LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE (3d ed. 2009 supp.)). 
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In Fariba, the court echoed the sentiments articulated by 
the court in Eurpac v. Republic, in which the court concluded that 
it was nonsensical to give greater weight to imputed knowledge 
than actual knowledge.321 In Fariba, the court reasoned that if 
section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) imputes knowledge to those creditors 
who could have reasonably obtained such knowledge, thereby hold-
ing them responsible as if they had actual knowledge, the stand-
ard should also be applied to hold responsible those creditors that 
have actual knowledge.322 The court concluded that “construing 
the knowledge exception to include constructive knowledge, but 
not actual knowledge, would lead to absurd results.”323 It concluded 
that its interpretation of the “generally known” standard was a 
reasonable, commonsense interpretation that was consistent with 
the apparent purpose of the legislature’s intent.324 
The Permanent Editorial Board in its recent proposed com-
mentary explicitly rejects the position that the “generally known” 
standard is satisfied if a party only proves the competing creditor 
has knowledge of the consignee’s practices by highlighting the 
priority anomaly that would result if actual knowledge by a com-
peting creditor satisfied the “generally known” standard.325 The 
Commentary states: 
Some authorities have misconstrued the condition contained in 
§ 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) by interpreting “generally known by its 
creditors” to mean “known by the competing claimant.” Under this 
misinterpretation, a given transaction would be a consignment 
subject to Article 9’s perfection and priority rules vis-à-vis credi-
tors without actual knowledge that the person in possession is 
“substantially engaged in selling goods of others” and would be 
excluded from Article 9 as to creditors with that actual knowledge. 
                                                                                                                        
321 Id. at 229. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
324 Id. The court substantiated its holding by quoting to section 1-103 of the 
California Commercial Code that stated the Code “shall be liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.” Id. But see Rayfield 
Inv. Co. v. Kreps, 35 So. 3d 63, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that “some 
legal rules explicitly allow their application to be varied by individual circum-
stances, using equitable principles, but the commercial law on secured trans-
actions is not among them”). 
325 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 4. 
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This anomalous result would open the door to circular priori-
ties without promoting in any Article 9 policy.326 
The Permanent Editorial Board has proposed amending Of-
ficial Comment 14 to section 9-102 to include the following: 
Under clause (iii) of subparagraph (A), a transaction is not an 
Article 9 “consignment” if the consignee is “generally known 
                                                                                                                        
326 Id. at 4–5. The PEB provides the following discussion regarding circular 
priorities: 
Consider a consignment of goods by Consignor to Consignee that 
is within the definition of “consignment” in Article 9. In particu-
lar, the consignment meets the condition in § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) 
that Consignee “is not generally known by its creditors to be 
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.” Consignor 
fails to file a financing statement against Consignee covering 
the goods and so holds an unperfected security interest. While 
the goods are in Consignee’s possession, Consignee grants a 
security interest in them to SP-1, who knows that Consignee 
holds the goods on consignment and perfects a security interest 
in them by filing. Thereafter, while the goods are still in Con-
signee’s possession, Consignee grants a security interest in the 
goods to SP-2, who also perfects a security interest in the goods 
by filing but lacks knowledge of the consignment. Under Article 
9, SP-1’s knowledge of the consignment would be irrelevant. 
SP-1’s security interest would attach to Consignor’s rights and 
title to the goods and would be perfected by filing, as would SP-
2’s. See § 9-319(a); § 9-310(a). SP-1’s perfected security interest 
would be senior to SP-2’s under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule 
of § 9-322(a)(1), and Consignor’s unperfected security interest 
would be junior to both perfected security interests under § 9-
322(a)(2). Now consider what the outcome would be under an 
erroneous interpretation of § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii), i.e., that SP-1’s 
knowledge of the consignment results in the application of non-
UCC law to SP-1’s claim against the goods, even though they 
are the subject of an Article 9 consignment. Under non-UCC law, 
the consigned goods typically would not be subject to the claims of 
Consignee’s creditors. As a consequence of the misinterpreta-
tion of § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii), no one of the three competing se-
curity interests would have priority over both of the other two, 
and a circular priority would arise. Consignor would have non-
UCC priority over SP-1; SP-1, as the first to file or perfect, would 
have priority over SP-2; and SP-2’s perfected security interest 
would have priority over Consignor’s unperfected security in-
terest (which, in turn would have priority over SP-1’s security 
interest, and so on). 
Id. at 5, n.27. 
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by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of 
others.” Clause (iii) does not apply solely because a particular 
competing claimant knows that the goods are held on consign-
ment. See PEB Commentary No. [ ], dated _______.327 
The persistent uncertainty surrounding how to interpret the 
“generally known” provision suggests that its elimination from 
section 9-102(a)(20) should be considered. The necessity of the 
requirement is certainly questionable given the movement of 
commercial consignments to Revised Article 9.328 The decision to 
include commercial consignments within the scope of Article 9 
brings with it the subtle, but significant, shift of placing on the 
consignor the burden of protecting its interests by providing notice 
to competing creditors.329 Neither the common law nor former 
Article 2 placed such an obligation on the consignor.330 And while it 
made sense under former Article 2 to include the “generally known” 
exception so consignors could avoid claims of creditors that were 
aware generally of consignee’s practices, the movement of con-
signments to Article 9 obviates the need to continue the tradition of 
the “generally known” exception. Now consignors have an af-
firmative duty to provide notice to protect their interests by simply 
filing a financing statement to avoid the problems of secret liens.331 
The concept of notice is a capstone of Article 9.332 Under 
Article 9, the fact that a competing creditor has actual knowledge 
of a competing security interest does not undercut its own secu-
rity interest.333 The relevant questions are whether its competi-
tor provided notice, and if so, when was the notice provided.334 
The perfection rules of Article 9 were devised to achieve notice, and 
notice serves a significant role in determining issues of priority.335 
A filed financing statement is an efficacious and efficient means 
of achieving such notice.336 It provides constructive notice to all 
                                                                                                                        
327 Id. at 7. 
328 WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167. 
329 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey 
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 469 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009). 
330 Id. at 467, 470. 
331 Id. at 470–71. 
332 Id. at 470. 
333 Id. at 472. 
334 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 131–32 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
335 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
336 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 131. 
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creditors.337 In that regard, it is much more equitable to consign-
ee’s creditors than the “generally known” requirement, which im-
putes knowledge to unknowing creditors if a majority of them have 
actual knowledge.338 
b. “Substantially Engaged” Requirement339 
The “generally known” standard also requires that the 
party prove that the consignee’s creditors generally know that 
the consignee is substantially engaged in selling goods of oth-
ers.340 However, the “substantially engaged standard” does not 
require a party to prove that the consignee’s creditors knew all 
the consignor’s identities or the specific items on consignment.341 
In Rayfield Investment, the Florida Fourth District Court of Ap-
peals noted that as a “general rule of thumb consignees are not 
considered ‘substantially engaged’ in selling the goods of others 
unless they hold at least [twenty percent] of inventory on a con-
signment basis.”342 
4. Exclusion of Consumer Goods from Article 9 Consignments 
Section 9-102(a)(20)(C) excludes from Article 9 consign-
ments any goods that were consumers goods immediately before 
delivery to a merchant.343 In In re Haley & Steele, the Superior 
Court of Massachusetts found that consigned goods “consist[ing] 
                                                                                                                        
337 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 471. 
338 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 4. 
339 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 472; In re Valley Media, Inc., 
279 B.R. at 125. 
340 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 472 (noting that even if actual 
knowledge by the consignee’s creditor was sufficient to satisfy the “generally 
known” test, the consignor had not proven that the consignee was substantially 
engaged in selling goods of others); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 125; 
Fariba v. Dealer Serv. Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
341 Fariba, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 231. 
342 Rayfield Inv. Co. v. Kreps, 35 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
343 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(C) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see 
In re Music Center RV, LLC, 304 S.W.3d 806, 809 (Tenn. 2010); Mackela v. 
Bentley, 614 S.E.2d 648, 650–51 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting secured party’s 
claim to consigned goods concluding that the consignment transaction was not 
governed by Article 9 because the goods were consumer goods immediately be-
fore delivery to the consignee). 
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of artwork that was used or bought for use primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes immediately before delivery to 
Haley and Steele ... falls outside of the ‘consignment’ defined in 
[section] 9-102(a)(20).”344 In In re Haley & Steele, the court ar-
ticulated the policy underlying the exclusion of consumer goods 
by stating that: “[A] typical consumer ... should not be required 
to comply with the complexities of secured lending under Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in order to have protection 
from [a consignee’s] creditors.”345 
In In re Haley & Steele, the court rejected the application 
of revised section 2-326 to consumer consignments noting that 
the Article 2 provision would subject consumer consigned goods to 
claims of competing creditors, which it viewed as contrary to the 
Article 9 reasoning for excluding them from the statutory defini-
tion of Article 9 consignments.346 Respected commentators James 
J. White and Robert S. Summers have posited that the rights of 
creditors whose debtors have consignment arrangements with con-
sumer consignors “will have to be determined by looking at the 
common law of the particular states.”347 
5. Exclusion of Consignments That Create Security Interest-
Securing Obligations from Article 9 Consignments 
Section 9-102(a)(20)(D) excludes from the definition of Ar-
ticle 9 consignments those consignments that create security 
interests “that secure an obligation.”348 By the exclusion, “[t]he 
drafters here have preserved a distinction between a conventional 
commercial consignment defined in 9-102(a)(20), which in almost 
all cases, is a ‘security interest,’ and the unusual commercial 
consignment which creates a security interest ‘that secures an 
                                                                                                                        
344 In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *3 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005). 
345 Id. 
346 Id. at *4 (quoting to the position of James J. White and Robert S. Summers 
in 4 Uniform Commercial Code at 38 (5th ed.) that “[i]t is unlikely that the 
drafters wished to leave the consumer consignor worse off than a commercial 
consignor, yet that would be the outcome if consumer consignments (now excluded 
from Article 9) are governed by 2-326”). 
347 WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167. 
348 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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obligation.’”349 However, both transactions are governed by the 
perfection and priority rules of Article 9, but the default rules of 
Part 6 of the UCC Article 9 handle the two differently.350 
The exclusion of consignments intended as a security, “that 
secure obligations” from section 9-102(a)(20), is consistent with 
how such transactions were treated by the courts under former 
section 2-326.351 The major distinction is that Revised Article 9 
explicitly provides that such transactions are excluded from the 
definition of an Article 9 consignment,352 while former section 2-
326 did not.353 Post revision, courts continue however to apply the 
tests developed by courts that dealt with the issue under section 
2-326.354 For example, the court in In re Georgetown Steel Com-
pany found that “[w]hether an interest ‘secures an obligation’ 
has been described as dependent upon whether there is a duty 
[of the consignee] to pay for unsold goods.”355 
C. Which Party Has the Burden of Proof Under Section 9-
102(a)(20)? 
Another issue on which courts are split is which party has 
the burden of proof under section 9-102(a)(20). Several courts 
have found that the burden of proof is on the party seeking pro-
tection under section 9-102(a)(20).356 In In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 
the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of New York stated 
that the burden of proof is on the party seeking protection under 
the statutory definition, but then proceeded to place the burden 
on the consignors who were arguing that section 9-102(a)(20) did 
                                                                                                                        
349 WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167. 
350 Section 9-601 provides that “this part imposes no duties upon a secured 
party that is a consignor,” therefore, the consignor does not have to comply 
with the collection, disposition, and enforcement provisions of Part 6 of Arti-
cle 9. U.C.C. § 9-601(g) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see WHITE 
& SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167. 
351 See supra Part III for a discussion on Former UCC Article 2 treatment 
of consignments. 
352 See WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167. 
353 See id. 
354 Georgetown Steel Co. v. Progressive Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown 
Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 352, 360 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004). 
355 Id. 
356 See In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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not apply.357 Like In re Morgansen’s, Ltd, the bankruptcy court in 
In re G.S. Distribution stated that the burden is on the person seek-
ing protection under section 9-102(a)(2), but unlike the Morgansen’s 
opinion, the court consistent with its statement, placed the bur-
den on the debtor asserting that 9-102(a)(20) applied.358 In In re 
Salander-O’Reilly Galleries LLC, the bankruptcy court noted that 
“in the Second Circuit, the burden of proof falls on the party 
claiming applicability of [section] 9-102(a)(20) to show that each 
element of the definition is satisfied.”359 
Other courts have established, however, a firm rule that the 
burden of proof is on the consignor.360 In In re Downey Creations, 
LLC, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Indiana 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the burden should be on the 
party seeking protection under the statutory definition.361 The 
court found that the burden should be placed on the party bear-
ing the risk under section 9-102(a)(20), which it identified as the 
consignor.362 It reasoned that “[a]s between a consignee’s credi-
tors and the consignor, only the consignor is in a position to de-
termine whether its transaction” satisfies the statutory definition 
of an Article 9 consignment, and if it determines that its trans-
action satisfies the definition, the consignor must “file a financ-
ing statement to perfect its interest” in the consigned good.363 The 
court stated that if the consignor does not file a financing state-
ment, it should “bear the burden of proving that the transaction” 
                                                                                                                        
357 In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
358 In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. at 561. 
359 Jacobs v. Kraken Invs. Ltd. (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC), 
506 B.R. 600, 608–09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, No. 14CV3544(VB), 2014 WL 
7389901, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014). 
360 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey 
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 469 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009); In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 
302 B.R. at 788; In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 124 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). 
361 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 469 (placing the burden of proof 
on the consignor to prove that it is generally known by debtor’s creditors that 
it was substantially engaged in the business of selling goods of others); TSA 
Stores Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565 B.R. 292, 299 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2017) (finding that the consignor must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the consignment is not governed by Article 9). 
362 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 469. 
363 Id. at 470. 
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does not satisfy the statutory definition.364 It posited that plac-
ing the burden on the consignor creates an incentive for it to file 
a financing statement, which consequentially “not only discour-
ages ‘secret liens’, but also provides more predictability, thereby 
reducing the need for costly litigation.”365 
The court in In re Downey Creations, LLC also reasoned 
that the burden should be on the consignor since former section 
2-326 explicitly placed the burden on the consignor to prove that 
one of the exceptions in section 2-326 (3) was applicable.366 Even 
though the court acknowledged that “[s]ection 9-102(a)(20) does 
not explicitly assign the burden of proof as former section 2-326 
did,” it highlighted that “the purpose behind the provision [section 
9-102(a)(20)] suggests to the Court that the burden nevertheless 
remains on the consignor.”367 
The court’s reliance on former section 2-326 was misplaced. 
Former section 2-326(3) explicitly provided that the consignor had 
to prove that one of the former section 2-326(3) exceptions applied 
to avoid the claims of a consignee’s creditors.368 And each excep-
tion was framed in the affirmative—the consignor had to prove 
it complied with an applicable sign law; the consignor had to prove 
that consignee’s creditors were generally aware of the consignee’s 
practices; the consignor had to prove it complied with section 9-
114.369 In contrast, Article 9 is silent on who bears the burden of 
proof.370 And the majority of the elements of section 9-102(a)(20) 
are framed in the negative requiring a party to prove that the 
merchant “is not an auctioneer;” that the good was “not a consumer 
good immediately before delivery;” and that “the transaction does 
not create a security interest that secures an obligation.”371 In 
addition, a party must prove that “is not generally known by its 
creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others,” 
                                                                                                                        
364 Id. 
365 Id. at 471. 
366 Id. at 469. 
367 Id. 
368 U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 
1999). 
369 Id. 
370 U.C.C. § 9-114 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999). 
371 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (em-
phasis added). 
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which specifically contrasts with the language of former section 
2-326, which required the consignor to prove in the affirmative 
that it was “generally known by its creditors to be substantially 
engaged in selling the goods of others.”372 
If a consignor literally proves the negative with respect to 
each of the above-mentioned section 9-102(a)(20) elements, the 
consignment transaction would be included, not excluded from 
Article 9 coverage; thereby subjecting the consigned goods to a 
creditors’ claims absent a financing statement filing by the con-
signor.373 In many instances, the consignor’s intent is to avoid 
coverage under Article 9.374 Rather than establishing a firm rule 
that places the burden on the consignor, a more sensical approach 
is to place the burden of proof on the party seeking protection 
under the statute. Typically, judicial lien creditors and secured 
creditors will be the parties seeking protection under 9-102(a)(20).
Placing the burden of proof on the party seeking protection fol-
lows both the letter and the spirit of the statute by assigning the 
burden to whichever party will benefit from its application. 
D. What Law Governs Non–Article 9 Consignments 
Another issue that courts have confronted is what law gov-
erns non–Article 9 consignments. Most courts have found that 
such consignments are governed by the common law of bailment 
unless state law other than Article 9 applies.375 A few courts 
have posited, however, that those consignments not qualifying as 
Article 9 consignments are subject to the “sale or return” provision 
of revised section 2-326.376 These courts have taken this position 
                                                                                                                        
372 Compare id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(ii), with U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999) (AM. LAW 
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999). 
373 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
374 See generally id. §§ 9-102(a)(19)–(21), 9-114. 
375 In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (concluding that since consumer consignments were 
not governed by the UCC after the 1999 revisions, they were once subject to the 
common law, which the court concluded was “essentially the law of bailments”). 
376 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (stating 
that “[o]nce it is determined that either former U.C.C. § 2-326(3) or revised U.C.C. 
§§ 9-102 (a) (20) & 9-319 (a) applies, the goods are deemed to be on sale or return 
with respect to claims made by the creditors of the consignee”); Georgetown 
Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 
352, 357 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004) (noting that if a consignment does not satisfy 
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even though the Official Comment 4 to revised section 2-326 states 
“[c]ertain true consignment transactions were dealt with in for-
mer [s]ections 2-326(3) and 9-114. These provisions have been de-
leted and have been replaced by new provisions in Article 9.”377 
And while most courts have followed the position expressed 
in the Official Comment, the few court opinions that have rejected it 
have created some confusion concerning this issue.378 
1. Consignment v. “Sale or Return” Transaction379 
In part, the confusion likely centers on the outward simi-
larities between consignments and “sale or return” transactions. 
Both transactions involve the delivery of goods to a merchant, 
which can return the goods to the owner if they are not sold.380 
However, the economic realities of the two transactions differ in 
ways that render them mutually exclusive.381 “Sale or return” 
transactions involve the delivery of goods to a merchant that 
purchases them for the purpose of reselling them to its custom-
ers.382 The “sale or return” provision under section 2-326 indicates 
that the goods are delivered to a buyer, and section 1-103 defines 
a buyer as a “person who buys or contracts to buy goods.”383 Even 
though the buyer “retains the right to return the goods, a com-
pleted sale is generally deemed to have taken place.”384 The mer-
chant becomes the owner to whom title is transferred, despite its 
right to return the goods if they are not sold.385 In contrast, con-
signment transactions involve a type of bailment for the purpose 
                                                                                                                        
the Article 9 definition of a consignment “it is likely governed by Article 2”); 
In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 788–89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
377 U.C.C. § 3-326 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
378 See PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3 n.19. 
379 U.C.C. § 2-326 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999). 
380 U.C.C. § 2-326 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).  
381 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that the two trans-
actions “are fundamentally different and are mutually exclusive”). 
382 U.C.C. § 2-326 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999). 
383 Goss v. Morgansen’s Ltd. (In re Morgansen’s Ltd.), No. 04-CV-0268, 2005 
WL 2370856, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
384 Id. 
385 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 5–6; see Georgetown Steel 
Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Co. (In re Georgetown Steel Co.) 318 B.R. 352, 361 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2004). 
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of sale in which the goods are entrusted to the consignee for sale 
without transference of title and ownership.386 In the former, the 
buyer becomes the owner of the good,387 while in the latter the 
consignor is merely an agent selling the goods on behalf of its 
principal, the consignor.388 
One area in which the issue has arisen is with consumer 
consignments, since they are explicitly excluded from Article 9 
coverage.389 Courts have found that such transactions are not “sale 
or returns” emphasizing that the delivery of such goods neither 
involves a purchase nor a transference of title to the merchant.390 
Courts have noted that subjecting such consignments to claims of 
consignee’s creditors would be contrary to reason for which they 
were excluded from the statutory definition of Article 9 consign-
ments,391 thereby circumventing the drafters’ intent to protect 
consumers, an intention evidenced by the exclusion of consumer 
consignments from the definition of Article 9 consignments.392 
In Haley & Steele, the court found that a consignment 
transaction in which artwork was delivered by consumers to a 
consignee was statutorily excluded from the definition of an Ar-
ticle 9 consignment.393 The court found that the Revised section 
2-326 did not apply to consumer consignments because that sec-
tion contemplated a sale with title passing to the consignee, an 
event which did not occur when the consumers delivered their 
artwork to the consignee.394 The court reasoned that analyzing 
the consumer consignment under 2-326 would subject the con-
signed goods to the claims of the consignee’s creditor, a result 
that would place “the consumer consignor worse off than a com-
mercial consignor.”395 
                                                                                                                        
386 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
387 In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 2005 WL 2370856, at *9. 
388 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
389 In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *3 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005). 
390 Id. 
391 Id. 
392 Id. at 4. 
393 Id.  
394 Id.  
395 In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005). 
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In Music City, the bankruptcy court for the Middle District 
of Tennessee presented with the question of whether a consumer 
consignment should be analyzed under UCC Article 2-326, certi-
fied the question to the Supreme Court of Tennessee on how to 
handle “orphaned” consignments.396 The Tennessee Supreme Court 
noted that the language of section 2-326 referred to a “buyer” 
and that Music City, the consignee, did not contract to buy the 
goods as the term “buyer” is defined by section 2-103(1), which 
defines a buyer as one contracted to buy goods.397 The court con-
cluded that section 2-326 did not apply because the consignee did 
not contract to buy the consigned goods, “but rather, as a con-
signee, [it] agreed to take possession and to try to sell them to a 
third party for a commission.”398 
While most courts have found that “sale or return” trans-
actions and consignments are mutually exclusive, a few courts 
continue to posit that consignments not qualifying as Article 9 
consignments are “sale or return” transactions subject to Revised 
section 2-326.399 In Morgansen’s Ltd., a bankruptcy court found 
that a consignment transaction that did not qualify as an Article 
9 consignment should be subject to analysis under Revised section 
2-326.400 The Permanent Editorial Board in its proposed draft 
                                                                                                                        
396 Waldschmidt v. Adams (In re Music City RV, LLC), No. 08-07724, 2009 
WL 77248, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Jan 5, 2009). 
397 In re Music City RV, LLC, 304 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Tenn. 2010). The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court agreed with the bankruptcy court that the consumer 
consignment was not a UCC Article 9 consignment because section 9-
102(a)(20)(a)(C) excludes goods that are “consumer goods immediately before 
delivery.” Id. at 809–10. 
398 Id. at 811. 
399 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (stat-
ing that “[o]nce it is determined that either former U.C.C. § 2-326 or revised 
U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(20) & 9-319(a) applies, the good are deemed to be on sale or 
return with respect to claims made by creditors of the consignee”); Georgetown 
Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 
352, 357 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004) (noting that if a consignment does not satisfy 
the Article 9 definition of a consignment “it is likely governed by Article 2.”); 
In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 788–89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
400 In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. at 789. The consignor appealed the bank-
ruptcy court ruling, and on appeal, the federal district court for the Eastern 
District of New York remanded the case for clarification from the bankruptcy 
court concerning its use of the term “buyer for resale,” emphasizing that, “there is 
no evidence that title passed from Goss to Morgansen’s with respect to any of 
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explicitly rejects the court’s position in Morgansen’s Ltd.401 A 
footnote to the PEB Commentary draft indicates that the bank-
ruptcy court for the Eastern District of New York in the In re 
Morgansen’s Ltd case erred in finding that consignment transac-
tions that did not satisfy the Article 9-102(a)(20) statutory definition 
should be subject to analysis under the UCC Article 2 sale or return 
provision.402 The PEB Commentary references In re Morgansen’s 
Ltd. by stating, “[r]ather than applying the common law, the court 
erroneously turned to [s]ection 2-326 and concluded that ‘the 
goods consigned to the debtor clearly were delivered on a “sale or 
return” basis.’”403 
The PEB Commentary Draft states that consignments and 
“sale or return” transactions are mutually exclusive and provides 
the following distinction concerning the two types of transactions: 
A consignment is a bailment, and the consignor remains the 
owner of the consigned goods. A sale or return is, as the name 
suggests, a sale, pursuant to which the buyer becomes the owner 
of the goods. Absent an agreement otherwise, the seller does not 
retain any interest in goods delivered to the buyer. The buyer 
becomes the owner of the goods, even though it has a right to 
return the goods and to transfer ownership back to the seller. 
A sale or return is not a consignment; a consignment is not a 
sale or return.404 
And the Permanent Editorial Board proposes that the fol-
lowing amendment to Official Comment 4 to section 2-326: 
The transactions governed by this section are sales; the persons to 
whom the goods are delivered are buyers. This section has no 
application to transactions in which goods are delivered to a 
person who has neither bought the goods nor contracted to buy 
them. See PEB Commentary No. [ ], dated _______. Transac-
tions in which a non-buyer takes delivery of goods for the 
purpose of selling them are bailments called consignments.405 
                                                                                                                        
the consigned items.” Goss v. Morgansen’s Ltd. (In re Morgansen’s Ltd.), No. 
04-CV-0268, 2005 WL 2370856, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
401 See PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
402 Id. at 3 n.19. 
403 Id. at 4 n.19.  
404 Id. at 3–4. 
405 Id. at 6. 
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2. Distinguishing Consignments from “Sale or Return” 
Transactions 
Courts have identified certain traditional indicia to dis-
tinguish consignments from “sale or return” transactions.406 One 
distinguishing factor in determining whether a transaction is a 
sale or return or a consignment is the form of compensation re-
ceived by the purchaser for subsequent sale of the good.407 One 
question is whether the merchant is compensated by commission 
or compensated by the difference between the price charged by 
the seller and the price set by the merchant in its resale of the 
goods.408 In a sale or return, the merchant receives a profit as its 
form of compensation, which is the difference between the cost the 
merchants pays the seller and the price at which it resells the 
goods to a third party.409 In contrast, in a consignment transaction, 
the purchaser is compensated by commission.410 In consignment 
transactions, the consignor establishes the price at which the con-
signed goods should be sold by the consignor.411 In United States 
v. Nektalov, the federal district court for the Southern District of 
New York quoting Gem Diamond Company of New York v. Klein, 
stated: “[A] ‘true consignment’ is characterized by the fact that 
the consignor retains ownership and sets the sale price; the con-
signee receives a commission and not the profits of the sale.”412 
Other traditional indicia of consignments include an ac-
companying selling list with the consignment agreement that 
references the prices dictated by the consignor instructing the 
consignee concerning the amount it must charge third parties 
                                                                                                                        
406 See United States v. Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc. v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 891 
N.Y.S.2d 260, 265–66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
407 See Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc., 
891 N.Y.S.2d at 266. 
408 See Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc., 
891 N.Y.S.2d at 266. 
409 See Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc., 
891 N.Y.S.2d at 266. 
410 See Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc., 
891 N.Y.S.2d at 266. 
411 Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299. 
412 Id. at 299 (quoting Diamond Gem Co. of N.Y. v. Klein, No. 92 Civ. 2503, 
1995 WL 72382, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1995)). 
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for the consigned goods.413 Also, custom will play a significant role 
in determining whether a transaction is a sale or return or con-
signment.414 In some commercial relationships, consignments are 
the prevalent form of business arrangements between parties.415 
Also instructive is whether the buyer bears the risk of loss once 
the good is in its possession.416 Transactions are more likely con-
sidered sale or returns if the buyer is responsible for mainte-
nance and is required to insure against theft or damage.417 
Nektalov is instructive because the court identifies several 
attributes that render a transaction a sale, rather than a consign-
ment.418 In that case, diamond owners argued that their delivery 
of diamonds to a diamond dealership contained the “traditional 
hallmarks of a consignment.”419 The court identified the following 
facts as persuading it to conclude that the transaction was a sale, 
not a consignment: (1) the time of possession; (2) the means of 
compensation; (3) the willingness of the owner to receive some-
thing of equal value back from the consignor, even when the deliv-
ered item was not sold; (4) the absence of a written consignment 
agreement; and (5) the price schedule.420 
The court highlighted one of the diamond owner’s testimony 
in which he stated that he “left it up to Roman Jewelers [the mer-
chant] to maximize the profit on the diamonds.”421 The other dia-
mond owner admitted that he had never allowed a merchant to 
retain possession of his diamonds for more than a year, but in this 
case, the diamonds had been in the possession of the merchant 
for a much longer period.422 Even though he testified that the ar-
rangement was a consignment, he “did not produce any written 
consignment.”423 The court found that the most damaging evidence 
                                                                                                                        
413 Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc., 891 N.Y.S.2d at 267. 
414 Id. But see Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (acknowledging that consign-
ments are frequently utilized in the diamond business, but indicating that “such 
a fact, in and of itself, does not dictate a finding that all diamond transactions, 
including the instant transactions, are consignments per se”). 
415 Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc., 891 N.Y.S.2d at 266. 
416 Id. at 267. 
417 Id. 
418 Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. at 298–99. 
419 Id. at 301. 
420 See id. at 301–02. 
421 Id. at 301. 
422 Id. at 302. 
423 Id. 
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was one diamond owner’s testimony that he would have accepted, 
in fact, “would have been entirely satisfied,” had the merchant to 
which he delivered the diamonds, delivered to him in return dif-
ferent diamonds provided they had the same value as the ones 
he delivered initially to the merchant.424 The court noted that the 
owner’s willingness to accept different diamonds than those ini-
tially delivered “cut against a consignment relationship, in which 
the agent-consignee solely possesses the goods, and the principal-
consignor retains a right to repossess the same exact goods prior 
to their sale to a third party.”425 
CONCLUSION 
The Article 9 legal framework for consignments treats in 
a much more comprehensive manner the rights of consignors 
vis-à-vis competing creditors than did former Article 2; however, 
the advent of the new framework has engendered new areas of 
uncertainties and perpetuated certain issues that were persistent 
under former section 2-326.426 The Permanent Editorial Board pro-
posed commentary and amendments to the UCC address some, 
but not all, of the issues of uncertainty surrounding the law of 
consignments.427 A complete revision of section 9-102(a)(20) should 
be considered that would include moving consignments from the 
general definitional provision of Article 9 to its own separate provi-
sion, similar to the movement of leases from former section 1-
201(b)(37) to revised section 1-203. Perhaps, the consignment 
provision should be moved to its own separate provision within 
Article 9 to include provisions to resolve the persistent uncertainties 
surrounding consignment law. 
Separate treatment of consignment law in its own revised 
provision may be necessary to provide greater clarity and cer-
tainty to consignment transactions. The revision could include 
provisions that resolve the uncertainties discussed throughout 
this Article. The “purpose for sale” issue concerning whether a 
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426 See generally PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9 (speaking to issues 
that were resolved by the new framework, but also highlighting current prob-
lematic places for courts). 
427 See generally id. 
478 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:413 
sale by a merchant back to the owner is a consignment could be 
resolved by including a provision that states, “A consignment means 
a transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person delivers 
goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale to a third party.” To 
resolve the “purpose of sale” issue regarding the delivery of raw 
materials, the revision could include a provision that states that 
states, “Consigned goods include any finished product generated 
from raw materials delivered to a merchant for manufacturing, 
processing, commingling, or the like for the purpose of sale to a 
third party.” And the revision could include a provision that resolves 
the burden of proof issue by providing that, “The party contending 
the applicability of section 9-102(a)(20) has the burden of estab-
lishing that each element of that section has been satisfied.” 
In addition, instead of amending the Official Comments to 
address the “sale or return” versus consignment distinction, per-
haps the revision could include a provision that states “Those 
consignments that do not qualify as Article 9 consignments under 
section 9-102(a)(20) are not governed by revised section 2-326 as 
“sale or return” transactions. Law other than Articles 2 and 9 of 
the UCC applies to such transactions.” Moreover, instead of amend-
ing the Official Comments to address issues involving the “gen-
erally known” requirement, perhaps the requirement should be 
eliminated since Article 9 imposes an affirmative duty on the 
consignor to give notice by filing a financing statement. 
A separate provision for consignments that provides com-
prehensive resolution of the vexing issues identified throughout 
this Article would bring much-needed clarity, uniformity, and cer-
tainty to consignments. And resolving these issues is best achieved 
by devising consignment rules consistent with the underlying 
principles and policies of Article 9 to ensure predictable and ef-
ficient outcomes. 
